The Mutual Existence of Nascent and Senescent World Orders by Akcaper, Burak
Portland State University
PDXScholar
Center for Turkish Studies Occasional Paper Series Center for Turkish Studies
10-2009
The Mutual Existence of Nascent and Senescent World Orders
Burak Akcaper
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: http://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/
turkishstudies_occasionalpaper
Part of the International Relations Commons, and the Islamic World and Near East History
Commons
This Book is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Center for Turkish Studies Occasional Paper Series by an
authorized administrator of PDXScholar. For more information, please contact pdxscholar@pdx.edu.
Recommended Citation
Akcaper, Burak, "The Mutual Existence of Nascent and Senescent World Orders" (2009). Center for Turkish Studies Occasional Paper
Series. Book 1.
http://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/turkishstudies_occasionalpaper/1
 i 
  
OCTOBER 2009 
CENTER FOR TURKISH STUDIES 
PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY 
THE MUTUAL EXISTENCE OF NASCENT 
AND SENESCENT WORLD ORDERS 
Dr. Burak Akçapar 
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES 
• Published by the Center for Turkish Studies & The Contemporary Turkish Studies Program 
• Editor-in-Chief:  Birol Yeşilada (Yesilada@pdx.edu) 
• http://www.pdx.edu/turkish_studies_center  
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES 
VOL. 1—NO. 1 
 ii 
CONTENTS 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS İ 
FOREWORD İİ 
I. INTRODUCTION 1 
II. THE SCHOLAR AND THE PRACTITIONER 7 
1. THE PRACTITIONER ALSO NEEDS INPUT AND INNOVATION 7 
2. THE IVORY TOWER 9 
3. THE OFFICIAL IVORY TOWER 11 
4. THE PRACTICING SCHOLAR 13 
5. COMMON GROUNDS 14 
A. SHARED TASKS 14 
B. SHARED PLATFORMS 18 
III. CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 21 
1. ECONOMIC SHIFTS AND POLITICAL DRIVERS OF CHANGE 21 
2. CONCEPTS OF THE WORLD SYSTEM: THE SCHOLARLY PERSPECTIVES 30 
3. THEORETICAL CONCEPTIONS OF CHANGE 43 
4. ORDERS AND COLLAPSES: ANATOMY OF CHANGE 47 
HYPOTHESIS ONE: 48 
HYPOTHESIS TWO: 49 
HYPOTHESIS THREE: 49 
HYPOTHESIS FOUR: 54 
HYPOTHESIS FIVE: 60 
HYPOTHESIS SIX: 60 
HYPOTHESIS SEVEN: 61 
HYPOTHESIS EIGHT: 62 
HYPOTHESIS NINE: 62 
HYPOTHESIS TEN: 63 
 
 
IV SENESCENT AND NASCENT WORLD ORDERS 65 
 iii 
V BACK TO REMARRYING SCHOLARSHIP WITH POLICY 96 
A. THINK TANKS 98 
B. POLICY PLANNING 104 
VI CONCLUSION 112 
ENDNOTES 116 
 
 
 
 i 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 
This working paper is based on a presentation I made in Ankara 
in June 2009 at the Middle East Technical University‘s eighth 
annual Conference on International Relations. I thank the 
organizers for the opportunity. 
 
Special thanks go to distinguished Professor Dr. Birol Yeşilada, 
Portland State University‘s Hatfield School of Government, for 
his invaluable comments on my working paper. 
 
The views expressed in this text are mine alone and cannot be 
attributed to or associated with any government or institution. 
 
I would welcome any comments on my working paper at 
burak.akcapar@gmail.com 
 
 ii 
FOREWORD 
 
 
In this essay I will address the issue of change in the 
international system which the scholars of International 
Relations have grappled with however inadequately. 
Accordingly, I will argue that this deficiency stems in no small 
part from the frequent mutual distance between scholars and 
practitioners of international affairs. I will, therefore, try to bridge 
this gap.  
 
Ultimately this essay will: 
 
a) Suggest a model (mutual existence of nascent and 
senescent orders) equipped with a number of hypotheses 
(laws) of systemic change in the international ―order‖; 
 
b) Provide a baseline for bringing scholarly and practitioners‘ 
perspectives closer together, including by identifying the 
crossover or mediating activities of the think-tanks and 
official Policy Planning units. 
 
 1 
I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Amidst global economic calamity the calls for a new 
international order are in vogue, again. This is some surprise 
because as painful as this economic crisis is, it does not 
resemble the typical juncture for a sea change. As John G. 
Ikenberry explains: ―At rare historical junctures, states grapple 
with the fundamental problem of international relations: how to 
create and maintain order in a world of sovereign states. These 
junctures come at dramatic moments of upheaval and change 
within the international system, when the old order has been 
destroyed by war and newly powerful states try to reestablish 
basic organizing rules and arrangements.‖1  
 
In modern history, 1648, 1713, 1815, 1919, 1945, 1989 are all 
examples to extraordinarily critical turning points where the 
victors acquire opportunity to shape new politics, set out new 
rules and principles of international relations. These are the 
periods when a new distribution of power abruptly emerges, 
and the ―leading or hegemonic states face choices about how to 
use their newly acquired power- choices that ultimately shape 
the character of postwar international order.‖2 Paul Kennedy 
 2 
agrees: ―Every so often in the history of international affairs, a 
great transnational turbulence shakes the foundations of the 
world and brings many of its older structures tumbling to the 
ground, as we witnessed in 1919, 1945 and 1989. In the 
confusion and babble that follow, it‘s difficult to see through the 
dust and recognize the shape of the altered strategic 
landscape.‖3 
 
For sure, great events which form moments of discontinuity 
from the standard practices and the typical are but only one of 
the markers of change. As Kalevi J. Holsti explains, great 
achievements like those denoted as a ―Golden Age‖ or as the 
reign of a particular leader; significant social and technological 
innovations; and of course ―trends‖ are also considered to mark 
change in international affairs, although there is no consensus 
among the IR scholars on how to define and identify change in 
the international system.4 Marking and assessing change or 
transformation is one challenge with which the discipline of 
International Relations has found it hard to reckon. 
 
At any rate, there is no convincing argument that the ongoing 
global economic crisis amounts to a dramatic and episodic 
moment the likes of which in history produced what Robert 
Gilpin called the ―systemic shift‖ in the global order. 2008 is in 
no way akin to 1453 when the Ottomans defeated the Eastern 
Roman Empire or 1918 when the US broke its taboos about 
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military engagement in the Old Continent. It is not 1989 when 
the US was left without any competing power with a rival 
ideology. There was no war. No major state or bloc 
disappeared. There was no political and military game changing 
change of circumstances. Despite the fact that the US 
Intelligence Community did warn that security risks would be 
aggravated by the economic crisis, there is room for skepticism 
even on that point. The economic crisis did not create new 
failing states; it might have exacerbated the situation in the 
already failing ones. 
 
It is true however that it all could have been different. To the 
credit of the Bush administration the vitalization of the G-20 was 
a masterful move. To the credit of the Obama administration, 
they continued the US support behind it. As in the 1930‘s Great 
Depression, this crisis could have hastened the fall into an 
international political abyss, even a global war. After all, there is 
already enough political problems, geopolitical rivalries, shifts in 
power balances, economic imbalances, and almost everything 
else that triggered not only economic but also political and 
military crises. That is not happening. The fact is 2009 is 
different from 1930‘s. During the Great Depression there was 
an adolescent world order. In 2009 that world order is mature 
after umpteen amendments and revisions, and a record of 
insufferable pain inflicted by mankind on mankind in the last 
one hundred years. 
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That said, the same mature world order may also be senescent. 
The current economic crisis may have produced an instance to 
highlight the fact that has been almost universally expressed 
but hardly acted upon: the current order of things in the world, 
whichever way one defines it, is manifesting serious wear and 
tear. It is maintaining a minimum order today yet should not be 
expected to live up to the challenges of tomorrow. At the end of 
the first decade of the 21st century, the international community 
finds itself in a flux in which almost every aspect of the 
international order is being challenged from the top down and 
from the bottom up. Irrespective of the economic crisis, multiple 
transformations are underway that are global in scope and 
historic in impact. Faced with a daunting agenda, even in the 
absence of a war, these may be the times when it is legitimate 
to ask hard questions and take bold actions. These are the sort 
of times when historic leaders, whether political or intellectual, 
are made. 
 
Against that background, the economic crisis may be an 
opportunity to revamp the world order. Debates already galore. 
Nevertheless, realistically speaking, no new world order, for 
better or for worse, will replace the current one this time around. 
Rather the next world order will be incubated in the human 
civilization‘s collective womb and tested gently in reality. If 
history is any guide, the basic contours of the international 
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system to come may have already made their debut. The old 
and the new are living together, one shaping up, and the other 
struggling to hang in. 
 
Bar historical determinism. History did not happen in a 
preordained way. Future will also be shaped by the vagaries of 
human action and follies. It will be a product of an 
unpredictability that humans have not as yet comprehended 
and unlocked. What we think is clearly visible is only that which 
is permitted by our limited knowledge and comprehension. 
Truth is what we create and believe in. Knowledge is not 
absolute but partial. 
 
However, therein rests the human dilemma: We need to 
understand. And, we need to participate in the shaping of the 
future global environment that will surround our destinies. 
Fatalism can be a personal attitude, but it is not a political 
approach. Formulating policies to shape and/or respond to 
changes taking place, however, is. If that be the objective, then 
the task involves accurate identification and analysis of the 
shifts and challenges; competent evaluation of options and 
opportunities; setting out of correct strategies and tactical 
policies. 
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This is no easy feat. The task to assess global change involves 
questions that have no easy answers. It also concerns both the 
academic and policy worlds in a way that neither can deny. 
Every IR position comes from some conception of the world 
system in which we live. Every international policy needs to 
take account of the world system. In fact, understanding world 
order and the phenomenon of global change is one subject on 
which the policy and academy circles need to collaborate. 
 
The following is a baseline effort to merge scholarly and 
practitioner‘s perspectives on assessing change in international 
circumstances in relation to what is already codified as world 
order. 
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II 
 
THE SCHOLAR AND THE PRACTITIONER 
 
 
1. The Practitioner Also Needs Input and Innovation 
 
Early on during my tenure at NATO my boss gave the 
unenviable task of finding a way to accommodate a partner 
nation‘s request to have NATO presence on its soil although 
NATO nations were not yet ready to deploy their forces. For 
hours I stared at a clean sheet of paper not even able to write a 
title to my plan. My contacts fishing for ideas from colleagues, 
superiors, friends and allied representatives did not produce 
any breakthrough. Bewildered, annoyed and increasingly 
stressed I took refuge in a bowl of ice cream while watching tv. I 
came across an interview by the chairman of the Virgin Group, 
Sir Richard Bronson, who was explaining his thinking behind 
lending the Virgin brand name to a cola producer. He would not 
produce cola, but lend the prestigious name of Virgin based on 
a rigorous analysis of quality. What worked for Virgin, I hoped, 
could work for NATO, which did not deploy forces but examined 
and approved partner facilities and lent the NATO/PfP brand 
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name. I went on to draft the ―Concept for PfP Training Centres‖, 
which was approved by the North Atlantic Council on 16 
November 1998 according to which numbers of such centers 
operate around the Euro-Atlantic geography to this day.5 I have 
yet to hear a story where International Relations scholarship 
came in out of the blue to help resolve a practical international 
relations problem. But, I remain dedicated to continue searching 
for common ground. The practitioner needs input from other 
outside not only to know more but also to achieve more. This 
help can come from variety of fields and should come from the 
scholarship, as well. 
 
If business and diplomacy have the shared pursuit of practical 
innovations resolving problems and generating gains (in my 
example, security gains for NATO and the partner in question, 
not to mention personal relief in having solved the quagmire), 
scholarship and diplomacy ought to have the shared hope of 
making this world a better place. After all, social sciences 
benefited immensely from the refugees fleeing Europe before 
and during World War II carrying lasting traumas of war, 
persecution even genocide. That said, scholarship and practice 
is now considered to be perpetually disconnected. It should be 
stated up front that I could not find any useful method for 
merging the two positions. And, this disconnect is partly by 
design.  
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2. The Ivory Tower 
 
A large segment of the academia consider it necessary even 
ethical to distance academic work from the subject matter which 
it is observing and analyzing. This assures academic integrity, 
and an enquiry that is free from values, distinguishing between 
empirical facts and subjective values. It is also a way for the 
academia to remain immune and neutral to the tainted world of 
politics. This point of view is even enforced within the academia 
by the fellow academics. President of the International Studies 
Association (2003-20034) Steve Smith observed that: ―within 
International Relations there have been many such disciplining 
moves, right back to the famous distinction between Idealism 
and Realism, through the disciplinary disputes between 
behaviouralists and classicists, and now manifested in the 
attack by rationalist scholars on reflectivist work, that is to say 
those engaged in post-modernist, feminist and gender, Critical 
Theory, ethnic and cultural approaches to International 
Relations.‖6 For those who detracted from the majority view and 
thus fallen out of the so-called scholarly legitimacy, there were 
consequences on their career and publishing prospects, 
reported Steve Smith. This is highly surprising even unsettling 
for someone who thinks life within the academia, unlike life 
within politics, business and bureaucracy, is a fairy tale.  
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The pretensions of isolation from the political world can itself be 
subjective. Smith makes this point, writing: ―to maintain that 
there is a secure isolated place where ―real‖ academics can 
report on the world itself relies on a prior, usually unstated, 
notion of the world. Such a view of social science takes the 
world as given as it presents itself to the analyst, as external, as 
separate, and does not therefore enquire into how theories both 
construct, reconstruct and are then constructed in turn by that 
world.‖7 What this account stops short of noting is that by 
constricting intellectual and scholarly inquiry within narrow 
paradigms, these conceptions are also complicit in sustaining 
the ―world‖ that politics has engendered and codified in the first 
place. It is not isolation; it is a live and let live perpetuation. 
 
Equally complicit may be the opposite point of view which aims 
to speak truth to power; engage the politicians and offer 
detailed case studies, rather than increasingly abstract theories 
and meta-theories. Although as a practitioner of international 
relations I obviously welcome such detailed case studies, 
although obviously not too many of them, I cannot but agree 
with Steve Smith that this view of International Relations 
scholarship ―tends toward the anti-intellectual in that it denies 
the possibility and desirability of the discipline reflecting on 
itself, and on the definitions of politics that it works within.‖8 
Academia as part of the broader intellectual community needs 
to be pluralistic, essentially rebellious, but preferably conscious 
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of its cultural subjectivities. The progress hardly comes from 
knowing more of the same within a static paradigm. And, 
paradigmatic shifts are the product of that dissenting, rebellious, 
but conscious thinking. 
 
The academic ivory tower exists. The 2008 Teaching, Research 
and International Policy (TRIP) poll by the Institute for Theory 
and Practice in International Relations of the College of William 
and Mary identified scholars which fellow academics voted as 
having produced the most interesting scholarship in the last five 
years.9 Joseph Nye, who is among those honorably mentioned, 
is critical of the fact that of the 25 scholars that fellow 
academics have voted for only three (including himself) had any 
policy experience.10 Although, Nye‘s recommendations to 
increase the policy relevance of the IR scholarship mostly 
concur with those of Stephen Walt and concentrate on what the 
academia should do in terms of promoting policy relevant 
publications and young scholars, his unstated initial premise 
about the downside of academics not finding jobs in 
government is open to debate.  
 
3. The Official Ivory Tower 
 
Obviously, whatever the academia does to be relevant, the 
convergence that is required between the academia and 
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practical world is also severed from the policy side. ―Thinking 
academically‖ is one pejorative qualification any practitioner is 
loath to hear. It is one mud that diplomacy hardened elders and 
colleagues can slap at any time with impunity. Academic is the 
exact antonym of relevant or realistic. Academics are revered 
as the once teachers not as the current guides. An academic 
becoming a political leader has to work twice as hard to prove 
him/herself as a businessman or a general aspiring to the 
same. 
 
At the same time, neither the politicians nor their advisers 
including the bureaucracy would want to hear anything that 
doesn‘t confirm their policy preferences. The appreciated ideas 
are essentially those that square the circle already drawn by the 
policy elite‘s own thinking. Exceptions usually prove the rule. 
 
Stephen Walt may thus be right in that policy makers pay 
―relatively‖ little attention to the vast theoretical literature in IR. 
He is, however, even more correct in stating that ―many policy 
debates ultimately rest on competing theoretical visions, and 
relying on a false or flawed theory can lead to major foreign 
policy disasters.‖11 Policy almost always has a certain political 
background event that is distorted beyond recognition and 
molded by the practical exigencies. Plethora of wrong premises 
and flawed theories and postulations followed the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks. A terrorist organization the political ideology of which is 
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incoherent, marginal and even outcast in any context was 
inflated beyond recognition and confronted with policies that 
only damaged and isolated the attacked rather than the 
terrorist. 
 
4. The Practicing Scholar 
 
Several scholars have indeed been able to implement their 
theories. The case of Professor Dr. Ahmet Davutoğlu merits 
separate analysis in terms of theory-policy convergence. The 
author of the doctrine of ―Turkey‘s Strategic Depth‖, eponymous 
with his acclaimed best-selling book, Dr. Davutoğlu has also 
had the opportunity to implement his theory, first as Special 
Advisor to the Prime Minister of Turkey, then as the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. Dr. Davutoğlu summarized his approach as 
follows: ―In terms of geography, Turkey occupies a unique 
space. As a large country in the midst of Afro-Eurasia‘s vast 
landmass, it may be defined as a central country with multiple 
regional identities that cannot be reduced to one unified 
character. Like Russia, Germany, Iran, and Egypt, Turkey 
cannot be explained geographically or culturally by associating 
it with one single region. Turkey‘s diverse regional composition 
lends it the capability of maneuvering in several regions 
simultaneously; in this sense, it controls an area of influence in 
its immediate environs‖12 Bülent Aras comments that ―the new 
foreign policy took form under the impact of Davutoğlu‘s re-definition of 
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Turkey‘s role in the neighboring regions and in international politics, namely its 
―strategic depth,‖ with frontiers that have expanded beyond the homeland in 
the cognitive map of policymaker‘s minds. The territorial limits to Turkish 
involvement in neighboring countries has disappeared in this new mindset.‖
13
 
This doctrine engenders in the policy of ―zero problem‖ with 
neighbors and a multi thronged near global Turkish 
engagement while not challenging, and arguably reinforcing, 
Turkey‘s NATO membership and its EU accession bid.14 This is 
one case where theory is turned into practice by none other 
than the architect himself. A similar case could be made for the 
influence of Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State although in 
this case Kissinger‘s realist thinking rather than his own 
theorization was on the foreground. 
  
Barring these and rather limited number of other exceptions, an 
academic serving in a practitioner role does not automatically 
produce the theory-policy convergence; neither does a 
practitioner who had the training to employ academic methods. 
That is mainly because of the inherent conflict between the two 
walks of life and the associated and expected mentalities that is 
not contingent on individual qualities, rather that which goes 
with the territory. 
 
5. Common Grounds 
 
a. Shared Tasks 
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That notwithstanding, common ground does exist. The 
academician and the practitioner face at least a couple of 
shared tasks: 
 
- Firstly, both need to compile relevant and discard irrelevant 
or misleading data. This task whether in terms of compiling, 
but also in filtering data, is greatly aided thanks to the 
diversity of third party data aggregators.  
 
- Secondly, they both need to assess and contextualize that 
data. Irrespective of whether that contextualization would 
take the form of theories, at any rate it would be consciously 
or unconsciously helped by theories.  
 
Once these two fundamental tasks are completed, from that 
point on the academician has the luxury of deciding whether or 
not to become immediately relevant for policy through concrete 
suggestions. On his/her part the practitioner, however, is 
obligated to carry his diagnosis all the way to the policy domain 
almost unfailingly under dire time limitations and near universal 
political, bureaucratic and cultural constraints. 
 
Although topical case studies by the learned men and women 
can often be of extreme use to the practitioner on almost all 
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sorts of policy issues, on assessing the meaning and 
implications of change in the world it is particularly incumbent 
on the practitioner to be aware of the intellectual lens through 
which every so-called detailed analysis is likely to proceed. 
 
The fact of the matter is that every concept of ―world order‖ 
rests on a certain theory about the nature of the actors in the 
world, the context that surrounds them and the type of 
economic, political and social interaction that exist among these 
actors. The divergence of view on these points is mind 
boggling. The roots of these differences of view are easily 
traceable to unresolved philosophical debates about the nature 
of man. Tell me who you think is right: is it Hobbes, Kant, Marx, 
Rousseau or Weber? The answer may well dictate the 
prognosis and prescription to follow. There are far too many 
useful theories and far too little time, energy and even 
opportunity to incorporate all of them into the policy world. This 
is complicated by the fact that all of these mainstream and non-
mainstream theories are in fact comets which include myriad 
internal variations making it practically impossible for any cast 
of decision makers and their counsels and bureaucracies, first 
to master, then to select, and then to agree on. 
 
However, this does not obviate the relevance of theory, and IR, 
for the practitioner. First of all, theories and knowledge of them 
provide a structure to thinking through issues, which in the 
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international level can involve a daunting diversity. Theories 
provide an opening through which one can move beyond 
knowledge as concatenation of data to knowledge that is 
derived from systematic analysis and synthesis. 
 
Secondly, most of these theories actually support a particular 
conception of the international system. This is true for the 
number of IR theories that is purported to be at odds with each 
other, including realism, neo-liberalism and constructivism. In 
their totality, these theories suggest that there is an 
international order to things that is enhanced by global 
institutions but in which it is ―natural‖ that the hegemon violate 
the order, however the system is nonetheless malleable owing 
to the potential for reconstruction of identities and actions 
through learning. In that conception, free trade is the norm, 
democracy is the ideal, global institutions are the way to go. If 
these reflect your particular values, then the job becomes 
easier. 
 
Thirdly, from the point of view of the practitioners and policy 
planners, theories provide a useful mirror to observe and 
understand the aspirations, ideas, ideals, actions, intents, 
purposes and even limitations of the societies and polities that 
produce them. This should in no way suggest a conspiracy 
between ruling elites and the academia. It is instead that 
academia as human agents are a product of the sociological 
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context within which they are socialized. That the world of 
theoretician is often times disconnected from the world of 
practitioner does not negate this premise. Mainstream theories 
become popular not only by the inherent strength of their 
arguments. They attract the fascination and admiration of the 
learned societies that see a certain relevance and explanatory 
power with regard to the actual world. Despite the winding 
debate about theory versus practice, I cannot locate any major 
theory that is not considered to have a fair shot in explaining 
what happened and aspires to shape policy towards what ought 
to happen.  
 
b. Shared Platforms 
 
Against this backdrop, the common ground for synergy 
exists basically on three platforms. One is task oriented, the 
other two are locational: 
 
- Two shared tasks of the academician and the practitioner 
are the first platform where a synergy is formed. Thus, 
gathering relevant data and assessing what they mean as 
aided by the theories. 
 
- Policy Planning as an analysis and synthesis oriented 
bureaucratic platform can help generate synergy by 
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engaging in actual or disciplinary dialogue between 
theory/scholarship and practice. 
 
- Think-tanks aspire to influence policy and form a bridge 
between scholarship and practice. 
 
The ideal product is not only a multi-disciplinary study, rather 
one that is also multidimensional and multifunctional. 
Multidisciplinary in the sense that IR cannot be self contained 
within its own theoretical premises but need to incorporate at 
least the economic and sociological aspects, as well. 
Multidimensional, because the policy and scholarly emphases, 
although mostly differentiated can ultimately be mutually 
complementary. And lastly, preferably multifunctional when the 
study ends up not only informing the debate and understanding 
but also generates policy outcomes. 
 
In the following sections I will adopt the approach I‘ve laid out 
above by first completing the two shared tasks of scholarly and 
policy analysis, and then to enter the academically voluntary 
field of policy synthesis in the spirit of bureaucratic policy 
planning. 
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In so doing I will develop and employ my own theses and pre-
theoretical framework in assessing change in world order and 
likely policy premises for states. 
 21 
IV 
 
CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
 
 
1. Economic Shifts and Political Drivers of Change 
 
As Holsti explains, ―currently, the field is in the throes of a major 
theoretical reorganization precisely because change, whether in 
speed, organizational types, or processes, seems to be 
ubiquitous in the contemporary world. But we do not know what, 
theoretically, to make of it because there is no consensus on 
what we mean by change, not to mention how we identify it.‖15 
Or, as Ruggie argues ―no shared vocabulary exists in the 
literature to depict change and continuity,…we are not very 
good as a discipline at studying the possibility of fundamental 
discontinuity in the international system.‖16 
 
The perplexing confusion within the IR scholarship is 
nevertheless met with an (occasionally) complacent clarity on 
the part of the broad informational sector that has emerged 
between the scholars and the practitioners. The practitioners 
may choose to afford not to follow the scholarly debates about 
international change. However, the non-scholarly writings of 
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public intellectuals, influential columnists, as well as panoply of 
think tanks and consultancy firms are omnipresent. Together 
this intellectually vibrant, factually rich but scholarly unassuming 
body of analysts has been reporting that a massive shift is 
underway in the world. 
 
A near unanimity exists however with regard to pinpointing the 
massive economic shift in the world from the Euro-Atlantic 
powers towards particularly China and India as the main driver 
of change in the global system. This shift of economic power 
has indeed become impossible to ignore. Since the prestigious 
global financial services firm Goldman Sachs published its 
paper ―Building Better Global Economic BRICs‖ in 2001, the 
countries making up the so-called BRICs have achieved 
staggering pace of development. The combined weight of 
Brazil, Russia, India and China has already reached 15% of the 
world economy. The BRICs are expected to overtake the 
cumulative size of the G7 countries by 2035. The BRICs are not 
alone on the path to reconfiguring the world‘s top echelons of 
economic pecking order. In 2005 Goldman Sachs then 
identified the Next Eleven (N-11) countries which ―could 
potentially have a BRIC-like impact rivaling the G7‖. Although 
the main criterion for the selection of these eleven countries 
was their population size, the group included Mexico, Korea, 
Turkey and Vietnam which ―have both the potential and the 
conditions to rival the current major economies or the BRICs 
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themselves.‖17 This is what Fareed Zakaria deftly called the 
―rise of the rest‖18. 
 
The shift in the economic balance of power is driven mainly by 
the explosion of manufacturing and some service industries in 
Asia that is aided by lower costs and deliberate government 
policies including regarding exchange rates. In the case of 
Russia and the Gulf States high oil and commodity prices were 
the main factor increasing their prospects. In turn, these two 
factors have created two consequences which are potentially 
lasting:  
 
One is that the locus of manufacturing has shifted to Asia. This 
has resulted in the shift of some 2.7 million manufacturing jobs 
to China from the US alone between 2000 and 2008. Today 
China by itself produces 40% of all microwave ovens sold in 
Europe; 50% of cameras, 30% of air conditioners, 30% of 
televisions, %25 percent of washing machines and some 20% 
of refrigerators sold in the entire world. Add other Asian 
countries and the picture becomes even more vivid for the US 
and Europe, the latter particularly if it fails to incorporate Turkey 
as member.19 
 
Secondly, extraordinary amounts of funds accumulated in the 
hands of governments. The special investment funds broadly 
 24 
labeled as Sovereign Wealth Funds now amount to an 
estimated $3 trillion. Despite their significant depreciation due to 
the global economic crisis, the forecast is that these funds that 
manage government wealth can reach $12 trillion by 2012.  
 
Together these two consequences consolidate a trend towards 
greater economic clout on the part of what Parag Khanna called 
the ―Second World‖.20 The economic crisis has further 
reinforced the erosion of the Western centric international order. 
As shockwaves from the collapse of US banks‘ rampant 
practice of providing high risk mortgage loans to people with 
poor credit histories led to a global credit crunch, pundits 
around the world have come to debate whether the deregulated 
market capitalism has reached the end of its lifetime and would 
now have to be reorganized. The view began to spread that the 
neoliberal policies of the last 30 years were the reason for this 
crisis. Financial Times warned against the reversals of 
globalization. 
The size of the bubble that was artificially created in the world 
through unregulated financial engineering is hard to fathom. 
The total value of assets such as mortgages, stocks, loans, 
bonds and the like is around $15 trillion. The bubble emerges 
when these assets are reinvested in financial contracts whose 
notional value, multiplied through reinvestments in derivatives. 
Thus, the funds thus inflated have reached in 2007 some $596 
trillion or even over $700 trillion, according to different 
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estimations. Compare this to the total value of goods and 
services produced in the entire world, which amounts to around 
$65 trillion. 
 
Estimations vary because no one actually knows the exact size 
of the financial bubble due to the type of accounting involved. 
The notional value of a derivative is contingent on the value of 
the real asset or index. While the latter is recorded on balance 
sheets, there was no rule to record the notional value artificially 
generated. Famous investor Warren Buffet called the 
derivatives ―financial weapons of mass destruction.‖ This too 
smart by half financial wizardry made possible only because 
nation states starting with the US failed miserably in bringing an 
order and control over the practices accelerated since 2007 and 
then exploded causing a chain reaction around the world‘s 
financial institutions. By early 2009 there was little doubt left 
that by the inevitable metastasis of the financial crisis to the real 
sector, the world writ large was engulfed in an economic crisis 
the depths of which were yet to be seen. Global capital that 
operates in the ―no-state land‖ beyond national sovereignty 
would have to be brought under control perhaps through global 
institutions. The initial panic was instigated by the fact that the 
money involved was not only heaps larger than the total GDP of 
the world‘s largest economy; it was heaps larger than the entire 
global GDP. It was aggravated by the cries of a ―ticker culture‖ 
whose sense of historicism is measured in minutes not eras. 
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Fareed Zakaria observed: ―Over the last six months, the 
doomsday industry has moved into high gear. Economists and 
business pundits are competing with each other to describe the 
next Great Depression. Except that the world we live in bears 
little resemblance to the 1930s. There is much greater and 
more widespread wealth in Western societies, with middle 
classes that can withstand job losses in ways that they could 
not in the 1930s.‖21 By mid 2009 the panic, but not the crisis, 
began to settle down. On the other hand, the sense of exigency 
and even doomsday forecasts have in fact helped avert a 
repeat of the 1930s. Governments reacted in a speedy fashion. 
They have taken measures including by trying –although not 
always succeeding- to resist the temptation to turn inward, 
which proved calamitous in the 1930s. The world order 
survived. 
 
Irrespective of the economic crisis, multiple transformations 
have long been underway that are global in scope and 
potentially historic in impact.  There is a case that the current 
economic crisis will need to have ramifications albeit gradual 
and minimal for the global and national economic systems. This 
is because the abrasion in the consensus behind the current 
global order is all too obvious. The trust in the Western led 
global financial structure is broken. The necessity for a more 
representative global power structure is widely acknowledged. 
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Globalization as an economic phenomenon has been hurt not 
the least by growing economic nationalism, including more 
assertive state control over the economy and the motivation to 
accumulate foreign current reserves while limiting current 
account deficits. Given the linkage between economy and 
politics, the economic crisis may have longer term political 
implications, as well. 
 
The challenges are manifold and concurrent. Any shortlist of the 
high order systemic challenges would include the stagnation in 
the reform efforts of the current cornerstone international 
organizations including the UN Security Council and the G8 as 
well as the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO; the 
depreciation of the powers to lead on the part of the 
superpower; EU‘s tragic introversion and lack of vision and 
direction; the demise of the confidence in the neoliberal 
prescriptions; the lack of coherent alternative economic 
prescriptions that would simultaneously generate growth and 
remedy inequalities; the inability to deal collectively with the 
transnational issues foremost economic development, trade 
liberalization and climate change, as well as terrorism; and the 
dismal failure in stabilizing the failing states around the world; 
not to mention the need to reinvigorate global good governance 
and the rule of international law. 
 
 28 
The crisis has also aggravated existing problems of 
international security. The US Director of National Intelligence 
warned in February 2009 that global economic turmoil and the 
instability it could ignite had outpaced terrorism as the most 
urgent threat facing the United States. Similar warnings came 
also from the UK. As the economic drama unfolded, of all the 
rising stars only Russia launched an armed anti-US and thus 
anti-systemic challenge to the global power structure when it 
invaded Georgia in August 2008. Russia thereby underlined 
with broad strokes its influence zone against the countries that 
seek to ensure their security under Western institutional 
umbrellas. China, India and Brazil as almost every other 
ascendant power around the globe have been acting within the 
system albeit with varying degrees of critical discourse. 
Nevertheless, several observers indicated that a process was 
underway for the US, which became the leading economy at 
the turn of the last century and the leading pole in the 1990‘s, to 
increasingly share ―authority‖ and seat at the global power 
equation. Irrespective of the merits of this point, there is already 
an actual pressure building in that direction.  
 
Geopolitics is back –if it ever went away- with a vengeance. As 
Robert Kaplan aptly describes: ―rather than eliminating the 
relevance of geography, globalization is reinforcing it. Mass 
communications and economic integration are weakening many 
states, exposing a Hobbesian world of small, fractious regions. 
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Within them, local, ethnic, and religious sources of identity are 
reasserting themselves, and because they are anchored to 
specific terrains, they are best explained by reference to 
geography. Like the faults that determine earthquakes, the 
political future will be defined by conflict and instability with a 
similar geographic logic. The upheaval spawned by the ongoing 
economic crisis is increasing the relevance of geography even 
further, by weakening social orders and other creations of 
humankind, leaving the natural frontiers of the globe as the only 
restraint.‖22 At any rate the order of globalization is expanding 
inexorably towards the areas it has little touched. Globalization 
with its economic, political, social and institutional precepts 
must to expand. And, that expansion is not a bad thing. 
However the transition is not easy.  
 
Remaining out of the system is the default position the inertia of 
which is hard to beat. However, the cost of staying out is far too 
heavier for the countries concerned and the world at large. The 
geopolitics of world order expansion will have significantly 
diverse effects on the countries involved. Some will successfully 
adapt and prosper, while several others will likely be squeezed 
under failing state structures, economic and social 
backwardness, and external interventions. Overall, as before, 
also in the future, staying out will be significantly more costly 
than accomplishing transfer towards the center. However, this 
geopolitics can also be tricky for the major powers. India and 
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China are already competing in the Indian Ocean. Other races 
should be expected around the world. Historically, the process 
of pulling in China into the global economic market and the US-
Japanese competition around 1917 produced deep shocks, 
even entry of the US into a World War. In our day and age, four 
regions in particular seem to be subject to strong currents and 
potentially shocks of globalization. These are Iran, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan; former Soviet Union‘s non-EU territories; former 
Ottoman Empire‘s Middle Eastern territories; Africa. The Indian 
Ocean and the Mediterranean in this regard will be standing as 
geopolitical center stages. 
 
2. Concepts of the World System: The Scholarly 
Perspectives 
 
I prefer the terminology of world system rather than the world 
order but will use both interchangeably. At least since the UN 
General Assembly advanced a plan in 1974 to redistribute 
wealth from rich to poor nations which it called the New 
International Economic Order and Henry A. Kissinger as 
Secretary of State in the mid-70's talked about "a new structure 
of stability, a new order of peace", the term new world order, 
and especially ―new world order‖, has in fact been overused 
over time by politicians, media commentators and academics 
alike, often meaning different things. The term may even be 
tainted given the numerous conspiracy theories associated with 
 31 
it. Obviously I would not know about the objectives of putative 
secret societies that aim to establish global dominion. However, 
that aside, the issue of the nature of the international 
architecture is a worthwhile topic of intellectual and scholarly 
scrutiny as well as a major policy-planning task. 
 
The term is much abused as it is incoherent. We read from 
Stanley Hoffman that at a conference organized in Italy in 1965 
five possible meanings for ―world order‖ were identified by the 
late French philosopher and political scientist Raymond Aron: 
―Two of the meanings were purely descriptive: order as any 
arrangement of reality, order as the relations between the parts. 
Two were analytical, partly descriptive, and partly normative: 
order as the minimum conditions for existence, order as the 
minimum conditions for coexistence. The fifth conception was 
purely normative: order as the conditions for the good life.‖23 
Georg Sørensen in a bid to cut through the confusion offers 
another definition: ―a governing arrangement among states, 
meeting the current demand for order in major areas of 
concern‖.24 This definition, like the long list of alternatives that it 
aims to clarify, is also fraught with problems. My own definition 
would be that a world order is the body of rules, principles, 
organizations, and anticipated actions considered to be 
governing the functioning, norms and purposes of the 
international system. This, admittedly, is also irreparably 
problematic. 
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Different theories of ―world order‖ reflect their particular 
reference points with regard to the nature of the actors, the type 
of economic, political and social interaction that exist among 
them and the international context. Aron, reportedly asked the 
participants in the conference to focus on the ―minimum 
conditions for coexistence‖. This reflects an ubiquitously realist 
perspective to world affairs which, according to realists, have 
not left the state of the law of the jungle: ―The society of 
sovereign states is in essence asocial, since it does not outlaw 
the recourse to force among the ‗collective persons‘ that are its 
members. Order, if there be one, in this society of states is 
anarchical in that it rejects the authority of law, of morality, or of 
collective force.‖25 Henry Kissinger argues that there are only 
two roads to stability: one is hegemony; the other is equilibrium. 
The latter is a restatement of the balance of power concept 
which frames the substantive content of the realist conception 
of the world order. 
 
Realists, who include among them a bewildering number of 
powerful intellectual icons from E.H. Carr to Kenneth Waltz, 
would thus argue that since world order is created and 
maintained by the power of state, orders would change with the 
changing distribution of state power. In conditions where 
hegemony is not achievable, world orders are created and 
recreated as rivaling states in the fundamentally anarchic 
international stage balance each other. Rules and institutions 
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are the product of this inherently volatile state of affairs. They 
may be created by enlightened awareness of the factors that 
create equilibrium. Alternatively, they could be the coincidental 
result of the balance that was conceived. The bottom line is that 
when the balance of power is upset, so does the order. Wars 
and power politics are accepted as natural and oftentimes the 
only means available for altering undesired political or territorial 
conditions. Any concept of order, realist thought would argue, 
does not abnegate the reliance on armed forces, secret 
diplomacy, and shifting alliances. The consequence of 
disequilibrium would be conflicts or even hegemonic war which 
in turn creates a new order as part of a postwar settlement. The 
order that is thus created would reflect the preferences of the 
hegemonic state, which would use its power to establish and 
maintain a particular arrangement. 
 
Realism and versions of it are the most pervasive and resilient 
of all theories and they are also considered common sense. 
After all, who can really refute the fact that if a state, democratic 
and capitalist or not, had enough power and will, it would do 
whatever it is that it can afford to do in order to maximize its 
interests even it that implied rupturing of an order it had the lead 
in establishing? If you are trying to refute this premise, please 
stop. From the perspective of any policy maker, the abnegation 
of the responsibility to take this possibility fully into account 
would be indefensible. Realism, and I am grouping versions of it 
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such as neo-realism into one school, has enjoyed global and 
timeless appeal across all polities and cultures. It predates the 
emergence of International Relations as a discipline and can 
very well be vibrant beyond it. After all, realists even count 
Thucydides among them. Yet, realism is not alone being helpful 
in providing insight and the insight it provides is not 
representative of the whole picture. Balance of power or 
hegemony premise of realist and neorealist theoreticians could 
not be taken at face value.  
 
To begin with, it is hard to deny that there is a certain 
international order that is applicable in most of the times. 
Voluntary ruptures of a particular minimum international order 
are not the rule but rather exceptions both in terms of the 
number of actors which can afford such behavior and the 
number of times they could afford it with relative impunity. There 
is a living and breathing system in place which includes the 
states as individual actors, states as part of groupings, 
international organizations that have a logic and sense of their 
own, and international law that does not have enforcement 
mechanisms comparable to developed national legal systems 
yet work through public pressure. This political layer lives 
alongside an economic order, which have national economies, 
international economic and trade groupings, multinational 
economic entities, private business that are truly powerful, not 
to mention international financial accumulations that are beyond 
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any country‘s sovereign control, not to forget again international 
law. As such, international organizations and international law 
are both the progenies and gatekeepers of a minimum 
international order that exists and works everyday. Hence, the 
usefulness of the neo-liberal theories in highlighting and 
appreciating that phenomenon. 
 
Neoliberal IR theories tell us that institutions are contracts 
among actors whose purpose is to reduce uncertainty about the 
actions of other actors. This approach needs to be seen in the 
context of the idealist view which disagrees with the realists 
―over the capacity of human society, and especially 
international politics, to eliminate the vagaries of existence in an 
anarchic state system.‖26 Accordingly, the international system 
is flawed because of the outmoded forms of human 
organization, whether domestically or internationally. These 
deep flaws however could be meliorated. Thus, states build 
institutions in a bid to realize joint gains, restrain opportunistic 
behavior, create norms, and where possible adopt enforcement 
mechanisms. The institutions mitigate the conditions of anarchy 
while reducing the transactional costs. As such institutions are 
utilitarian and functional ―agreements about a structure of 
cooperation‖.27 These institutions in return for the benefits they 
provide require the acceptance of constraints on individual 
behavior. The world order includes a host of multilateral 
institutions which ―like governments…issue rules and publicly 
 36 
attach significant consequences to compliance or failure to 
comply with them-and claim authority to do so.‖28  
 
They nonetheless do not simulate all functions and jurisdictions 
of a state. For instance, they stop short of monopolizing the 
legitimate use of force within a specified territory, at least 
without the consent of their constituent states. Examples to 
such ―global governance institutions‘‘ include the UN Security 
Council, the International Criminal Court and the other 
international permanent courts and tribunals, the International 
Monetary Fund as well as the World Trade Organization. This 
includes the other non-governmental networks including those 
of judges and regulators. Anne Marie Slaughter observes: 
 
―We live in a networked world. War is networked: the 
power of terrorists and the militaries that would defeat 
them depend on small, mobile groups of warriors 
connected to one another and to intelligence, 
communications, and support networks. Diplomacy is 
networked: managing international crises — from SARS 
to climate change — requires mobilizing international 
networks of public and private actors. Business is 
networked: every CEO advice manual published in the 
past decade has focused on the shift from the vertical 
world of hierarchy to the horizontal world of networks. 
Media are networked: online blogs and other forms of 
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participatory media depend on contributions from readers 
to create a vast, networked conversation. Society is 
networked: the world of MySpace is creating a global 
world of "OurSpace," linking hundreds of millions of 
individuals across continents. Even religion is 
networked…‖29 
 
Slaughter takes the argument even further by pointing out that 
the emerging world order will exist ―above the state, below the 
state, and through the state.‖ Accordingly, the state will 
continue to exist and maintain its position as the main 
constituent element of the global order. But, ―state with the most 
connections will be the central player, able to set the global 
agenda and unlock innovation and sustainable growth.‖30 
 
Theories by their nature are abstractions derived from 
observation of the reality. They reflect what the theorists sees 
as ultimately essential and what expendable. The particular 
philosophical lens shapes the angle through which this 
selection is made and the reality interpreted. As such, both the 
realist and liberal strands of international relations theory adopt 
a filter to understate the role of ideas, identities and norms in 
world politics. Enter the Constructivists who bring this focus into 
the debate on world affairs and orders.  
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Constructivists argue that ―the identity and interests of states 
(and other actors) change across contexts and over time. Who 
actors are and what actors want is determined by their 
interactions with other actors and by the larger social context in 
which they exist.‖31 States learn to act in a particular way. Their 
socialization within the international society influences what 
states pursue and how they define their interest. As the 
behavior and interactions of actors change over time, so does 
the context of world politics. International institutions shape the 
behavior of states in accordance with socially constructed 
worldviews. Interests and actions are defined by the pattern of 
relationships that are set out in these institutions. In the words 
of Peter Katzenstein, ―institutionalized power can be seen to 
mold the identity of the states themselves and thus the interests 
they hold.‖32 Change in the world order is a result therefore not 
only of the relative capabilities of the states but also of the 
current thinking on the principles and purposes that shape the 
basic identities of states. In the words of Alexander Wendt, in ―a 
world in which identities are learned and sustained by 
intersubjectively grounded practice, by what states think and 
do, is a world in which anarchy is what states make of it.‖33  
 
Wendt also argues for the inevitability of a world state within 
100-200 years, which would be a product of the struggle of 
individuals and groups for recognition of their subjectivity, as 
well as the logic of anarchy, which generates a tendency for 
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military technology and war to become increasingly destructive. 
The instabilities of a system of states would usher in a society 
of states, which would also be unstable. Thus, a world society 
would emerge to be improved by collective security and 
ultimately by the world state, in which ―as in territorial states 
today, cooperation… would be mandatory and enforceable.‖34 
This obviously is the kind of an end-state that conspiracy 
theories have actually been alluding to for long time. Since the 
emergence of the world state is deemed to be historically 
contingent and the nation state should be expected to resist its 
demise, a struggle should be as inevitable as the world state. 
Constructivism although considered a rebel within mainstream 
IR scholarship is nonetheless not only mainstream but currently 
most popular within academic circles. 
 
The mainstream theories, like the international order they 
postulate about, are those that reflect the particular viewpoints 
and interests of the major forces, whether economic, political, 
military or ideational, that had shaped the particular 
international order in the first place. Otherwise, these theories 
would be located at the fringes and left outside the mainstream. 
The mainstream theories almost inevitably perpetuate the 
centrality of the major state actors, their political and economic 
regimes, and the preferred modes of interactions among state 
and non-state players. As such, much of the IR theorization is 
actually of less relevance and use from the standpoint of much 
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of the rest of the world. The most important possible exception 
arises when the rest of the world must assess the politics and 
current behavior of the most powerful actors at the top of the 
global pecking order. In these cases, the mainstream theories 
may be of use in assessing why, when, how‘s of great power 
actions. In turn, the theories that do not start off from the 
centrality of leading powers and their preferred political, 
economic and institutional ideas and norms are of less 
relevance to those who have the upper hand in shaping the 
international order by their leverages and actions. 
 
Although Wendt, also makes a case that his argument in favor 
of World State has ―interesting‖ grand strategy implications, I 
have serious doubts as to whether any state can have a 100 
year grand strategy in place. It may sound banal, but in fact the 
default position for the primary mental frame of policy makers 
across cultures and time is located somewhere between 
―realism‖, ―pragmatism‖ and whatever is considered to be 
―common sense‖. In reality, I suspect, ―bandwagoning‖ is as 
much a factor as anything else, at least for most of the actors. A 
limited number of US and other Western think tanks and 
newspapers and TV channels shape assessments around the 
world in much more effective ways than countless empirical 
studies and theoretical ruminations. In international relations, 
reality is what it is perceived to be, not what is empirically 
proven to be. In that regard, constructivist point of view is not 
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too far off from restating what states have known all along: 
socialization and indoctrination, and the ―control‖ of the means, 
is as important in the international scene as it is domestically. 
Whether in the form of subtle public diplomacy or aggressive 
information operations and propaganda, influencing the nature 
of information is a vital task. This is particularly so in open 
societies and democratic regimes although others are surely 
not exempt. 
 
These may be the dominant Western IR paradigms, but they 
are not the only one. The hopelessly divided IR scene is in fact 
rich and diverse in contending or non-mutually exclusive 
theories, meta-theories, pre-theories, theses and postulates. 
For instance, Orientalism and Post-Colonial theory, which I 
haven‘t addressed in this essay, also offer equally stimulating 
and interesting perspectives. This body of scholarship 
competes to quantitatively or qualitatively ―prove‖ that their 
particular image of world order has the explanatory power of the 
reality as was, as is and as would be. 
 
In this regard, Robert Harkavy identified seven models or paradigms 
which he calls ―discrete images‖ whose proponents assert would 
define international reality. Although his article was written in 1997 
these models continue to contest. These include the three-bloc 
geoeconomics; the multipolar balance of power model hinged on the 
traditional "realist" and/or neo-realist frameworks; the controversial 
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"clash of civilizations" thesis; the unipolar dominance model, related 
to the traditional geopolitical "long cycle" theory and to theories of 
"hegemonic stability"; the "zones of peace" versus "zones of turmoil" 
model based on the apparently widening gulf between the developed 
and developing worlds; the "global village" model based on the 
apparent shift of power and sovereignty from nation-states to 
international or non-governmental organizations, and the growth of 
functional global regimes; the bipolar-redux model anticipating either 
a future challenge to U.S. dominance by China, Russia, Japan, or 
Europe, or a return to some sort of bipolar bloc structure.35 
 
As Harkavy notes, these models are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. The author of the Clash of Civilizations, Samuel 
Huntington, himself stated a world otherwise defined by the "clash of 
civilizations" might be alternatively characterized by "One World: 
Euphoria and Harmony" akin to Fukuyama‘s end of history 
predicated on the global acceptance of representative government 
and market economics; "Two Worlds: Us and Them" such as rich 
north versus poor south or the West versus the rest or market 
economies versus state capitalists; "184 States, More or Less," 
which is builds on classical realism; or "Sheer Chaos" which again 
can come under the realist paradigm and denotes a point beyond 
zones of turmoil thesis predicting governmental collapse, 
disintegration of states, ethnic, sectarian and tribal warfare, refugee 
torrents, rampant proliferation and terrorism in the developing world.  
 
Before moving on, I should also recall that IR scholarship is by no 
means exclusively theoretical and includes an even richer body of 
case study literature. These mostly describe, analyze and interpret a 
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particular clearly narrowed down topic or region or phenomenon. 
There is however less to be said on those because as valuable as 
these studies are they do not carry a presumption of 
comprehensiveness and of explanatory power for the world system 
writ large. And, they are under strong competitive attack from the 
think tank and third party consultancy world in terms of relevancy for 
the policy world, a point I will return later in this essay. 
 
3. Theoretical Conceptions of Change 
 
I have referred to the difficulty in pinpointing what exactly is 
meant by change although analysis of change is inherent in the 
field of international relations theory. Holsti is critical of the 
proliferation of terminologies without a coherent sense of what 
is important and what is not: 
 
―A whole new vocabulary of clichés or analogies has 
invaded debate. ―Globalization,‖ the ―global village,‖ 
―spaceship earth,‖ ―interdependence,‖ the ―new 
millennium,‖ ―the borderless world,‖ and the like, suggest 
that we have entered, or are entering, a new era or epoch 
in which contemporary ideas, practices, institutions, and 
problems of international politics are fundamentally 
different from their predecessors. But popular monikers, 
while evocative of things that are different, do not 
substitute for rigorous analysis. Lacking in all of this claim 
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of novelty is a consensus not only on what has changed 
but also on how we can distinguish minor change from 
fundamental change, trends from transformations, and 
growth or decline from new forms.‖36 
 
Holsti goes on to argue that there are five conceptions of 
change which he lists as: ―change as replacement‖; ―change as 
addition‖; ―dialectical change‖; and ―change as transformation.‖ 
Accordingly, in the concept of ―change as replacement‖, a 
significant change happens which is usually the antithesis of 
something old. Thus, if the assertion is correct that the end of 
the Cold War has made war among great powers improbable, 
then a significant pattern in relations among such powers has 
changed. That in turn points to a major discontinuity and 
replacement of the old not a transformation. 
 
Under ―change as transformation‖, quantitative changes 
accumulated and in time produce something new. Here there is 
certain continuity between the old and the new.  
 
―Change as addition‖ involves complementary features to arise 
and exist alongside what already is present. The fact that 
internal wars are more common does not negate the premise 
that external wars can and do happen as before. Old patterns 
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and concepts are not inevitably replaced. Instead they are 
further complicated.  
 
Last but not least, the concept of ―dialectical change‖ can mean 
the old and new interacting to produce something novel but 
continuous which is not a total replacement. The Marxist 
version of this concept can also mean the thesis and the anti-
thesis producing a superior synthesis. 
 
Holsti‘s classification can be more complicated than necessary. 
The distinction between transformation, dialectical change and 
addition is although valid it is also fine. A dialectical interaction 
is always at play in social phenomena and especially in the 
international stage, all transformations begin with an addition. 
Those additions if they manage to resist the corrosive influence 
of time and events and find the appropriate context culminate in 
a transformation. The question of impact is therefore most likely 
to be a result of time and opportunity. The cataclysmic or 
systemic moments provide for the latter. And, the concept of 
change as absolute replacement is almost unrealistic and 
extremely rare. The UN in all reality except in legal sense did 
not totally replace the League of Nations it has transformed it 
and created something new out of the genes of something 
existing. The Warsaw Pact is dead but there is the CSTO albeit 
much different in many respects. Although, far too many 
commentators write in a way that seem to suggest total 
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ruptures and discontinuities, it is hard to think that they actually 
mean it all the time. Are there truly that many thinkers who 
believe that that in the international system something old is 
totally effaced when something different arrives? The most 
notorious example of a verbal abuse is the title of Francis 
Fukuyama‘s 1992 best seller The End of History and the Last 
Man. The sophisticated albeit flawed argument that Fukuyama 
sets out in that book is totally victimized by a title that sells the 
book but allows the inherent argument to corrode rather 
immediately under sunlight. Examples to snappy wordage, 
titling, but also argumentations, flash news assertions of new 
world orders, clean breaks, unprecedented developments and 
other superlatives must be a lamentable anti-intellectual 
malaise of our contemporary culture and economy. 
 
At the same time, basic question implied in Holsti‘s 
classification is truly insightful: what constitutes meaningful 
change and not a ―mere quantitative change on a particular 
dimension of international communication over a relatively short 
period of time‖. In Holsti‘s words ―for the stock market player, 
the day‘s events, or the week‘s economic trends may be a key 
component of buy or sell decisions. But for the theorist of 
international politics, mere quantitative change on a particular 
dimension of international communication over a relatively short 
period of time will probably be of little interest unless those 
trends have a demonstrable major impact on how diplomatic, 
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military, or commercial things are typically done. The change 
must have significant consequences.‖ In Rosenau‘s terms that 
significant change happens when the established and time 
tested basic rules, including norms, procedures and institutions 
become ―variables‖ although Rosenau himself is conflicted 
whether to subsribe to an additive notion of change or one that 
is based on replacement.37 How do these ruminations help 
assess the changes in the international order? 
 
4. Orders and Collapses: Anatomy of Change 
 
Examination of these shifts and their drivers individually 
however do not suffice in conceptualizing change in a 
comprehensive fashion. That is when the need for a 
comprehensive framework of understanding change is needed 
both by the practitioner and the scholar. 
 
Unfortunately, the fact is there is no consensus among the 
scholars of International Relations on how to define and identify 
change in the international system.38 Marking and assessing 
change or transformation is one challenge with which the 
discipline of International Relations has found it hard to reckon. 
 
The popular premise among IR scholars is that world orders 
change in a cycle of war, breakdown and reconstruction in what 
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Peter Katzenstein called a ―sequence of irregular big bangs.‖39 
In modern history, the end of the two world wars as well as that 
of the cold war are examples of extraordinarily critical turning 
points where the victors acquire opportunity to shape new 
politics, set out new rules and principles of international 
relations. In reality, great ―events‖ such as wars or their endings 
are not the only markers of fundamental change. Great 
achievements or failures during the reign of particular leaders; 
major social and technological innovations and discoveries also 
considered to mark change in international affairs. All these 
however take a snapshot fixed in time or period of ceremonial 
beginnings and endings at the cost of the incremental 
processes that precede them.40 The analysis of trends, whether 
mega- or micro- do go further in indicating change as it flows in 
historical course yet again are specific in focus and not 
comprehensive in conceptualizing overall change. In the 
ensuing paragraphs, I suggest a model of change in the world 
system built upon a series of hypotheses that mark the 
evolution of the global order. 
 
Hypothesis One:  
 
Any international order is, in fact, reflective of the global political 
and economic architecture which in turn is a codification 
permitted by a period‘s circumstances. It reflects the minimum 
that is achievable in a sustained fashion. The wars and other 
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systemic moments facilitate adoption of a certain arrangement 
which is beneficial to the victor. Nonetheless, even from the 
victor‘s standpoint that arrangement reflects a compromise that 
is acceptable at a given mortal moment. In a world that will 
always be in flux there is no future-proof world order or 
―perpetual peace.‖ 
 
Hypothesis Two: 
 
As such, a world order is not a novel creation but an 
arrangement that is naturally selected from among the already 
extant options. Those options and the overall arrangement 
cannot be too much ahead of its time without being 
incomprehensible. Instead, those arrangements do not reflect 
only the interest of the powers to be. These concrete institutions 
and setup of a world order also represents the niveau of 
thinking already reached among the policy makers and their 
learned and lay publics. Therefore, what exists and what will 
supplant are most probably already here with us, one in 
senescent, the other in nascent or prototypical form. The world 
order at any moment thus coexists with its successor. This 
redundant existence ends with the demise of the old but is soon 
to be re-enacted with the birth of the next.  
 
Hypothesis Three:  
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The next order will be carrying the genes of its predecessor 
complete with several flaws that pass from generation to 
generation. The realists are right in pointing out to these 
endemic flaws, but constructivists are also right to assume that 
some of these are containable. Institutions, liberals would come 
in here, are one way of containing and transforming these 
flaws. Ultimately, however, realists are likely to be right again as 
when orders collapse or when an action of a determined actor 
is not deterred havoc would break. The Power Transition 
theoreticians may also offer useful insights in that regard by 
indicating when instability would peak and due to tension 
between which types of powers.41 
 
The mainstream classification is to treat post World War I and 
post World War II world orders as separate. By the end of World 
War I a new political world order did indeed start to take shape. 
However, alternatively, one could also argue that it took a 
calamitous crash of the world economy particularly of the most 
advanced capitalistic economies of the US and Germany but 
not the Stalinist Russia; a cataclysmic crash of liberalism and 
the ascent of totalitarian ideologies; a total world war that killed 
tens of millions of people for this world order to be refined and 
fully instituted. The idea captured and promoted by the 
President although not the Congress of the leading power was 
―replacing a balance of power approach to world order with one 
based on collective security under the auspices of the 
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organized international community.‖42 Accordingly, the League 
of Nations established to ensure collective security; to assure 
functional cooperation; and to execute the mandates of peace 
treaties, as set out in the Covenant of the League. The 
Covenant became Part I of the peace treaty of Versailles. The 
creation of the League was followed by the institution of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice. The United States 
which created the institutional underpinnings of the new world 
order opted not to participate in it. European powers probably 
agreed to the League out of deference to President Wilson 
whose forces ended the war of the trenches. 
 
The League of Nations may have been the creation of a victorious 
President Wilson who worked hard to realize his ―program for peace‖ 
which pronounced as item 14 that a ―general association of nations 
must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording 
mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to 
great and small states alike.‖ Yet, President Wilson‘s fourteen 
principles for world peace were in fact derived from the ―18 Final 
Recommendations to End the War and Foster Peace‖ adopted in 
1915 International Women‘s Congress held in The Hague where 
some 1,200 delegates from twelve countries were represented. 
Furthermore, the International Peace Bureau of the 
Interparliamentary Union established in 1889 by pacifist members of 
parliament was an inspiration for the League. These ideas and 
forerunner initiatives were seized by President Wilson whose political 
clout in Europe helped transform them into tangible institutions 
supporting the world order. 
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The League was not without its achievements. Its work in aiding the 
refugees of war, in improving health services and labor conditions 
around the world, as well as the settlement of the dispute over the 
Aland Islands and the Greek-Bulgarian conflict are among its notable 
successes. Yet, League‘s failings were phenomenal. These included 
Japan‘s invasion of Manchuria, France‘s occupation of Ruhr, Italy‘s 
occupation of Kerkira (Corfu) and Abyssinia (Ethiopia) and ultimately 
World War II. In fact, from the very beginning the League‘s 
engagement in collective security proved shoddy. The League 
always tried to refrain from disputes involving permanent members or 
their interests and when it did enter that minefield it failed to be 
effective. The League‘s disposition of former German and Ottoman 
Empire territories in the form of mandates to major powers effectively 
created a market for a new sort of colonialism. 
 
The failures of the League of course are better known. However, 
these aside, as Falk notes, the idea of an organized international 
community survived World War II and ―the presence of an 
institutional center for world politics has not been allowed to 
disappear from the international scene.‖43 The League was based on 
an idea that was good in essence but its timing was perhaps not 
right. 
  
Thus, following the worst carnage of all times in World War II an 
international institutional setup was created in the form of the United 
Nations, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and 
the International Monetary Fund. Deals struck in San Francisco and 
Bretton Woods came to consolidate an international order which took 
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account only partly of the failings of the previous institutional setup 
and better reflected the American primacy in world affairs, despite 
the bipolar structure that was in the offing. Thus, the seat of the 
United Nations and its Security Council was established in New York 
with offices also in Geneva and Vienna for specialized agencies, and 
the World Bank and IMF based in Washington DC. 
 
When one looks closer the great paradox of the 19th century appears 
in astonishing perplexity. Economic liberalization continued 
throughout this century together with a benign proliferation of 
international institutions. Often conceived as a bottom up process, 
inspired no doubt by the ideals of the American and French 
revolutions of the earlier century, notable individuals took up 
internationalist causes that culminated in the creation of such 
enduring institutions as the International Committee of the Red Cross 
in 1864 and the Universal Postal Union in 1874 and the International 
Olympic Committee in 1894. The codification of international law 
regarding the treatment of non belligerents in war and settlement of 
disputes in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conferences provided a 
befitting ending to an eventful century in which humanity took large 
steps forward in expanding human rights and international 
cooperation to sustain peace and prosperity. 
 
Almost simultaneously, the great powers were arming to the teeth, 
arms races were raging among navies which were essential 
instruments of power projection to colonies and alliances were being 
forged. As Paul Kennedy observes, ―the era from 1871 to 1914 was a 
bizarre and puzzling one, with great and increasing evidence of 
international integration existing side by side with ethnic-nationalist 
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passions, warmongering, and social Darwinist notions about the 
primacy of struggle.‖44 
 
Thus, the mere establishment of the League was not sufficient to 
govern a minimum world order and despite its bases among peace 
movements around Europe, the strategic context was not yet ripe for 
it to be effective. In fact, the League by virtue of being prematurely 
born may have even been counterproductive for world peace. The 
expectations created around the League may have contributed to the 
abandonment of balance of power strategies to contain the Nazi‘s 
expansionism and the League‘s weaknesses further exacerbated the 
resolve of Germany, Italy and Japan. The failure to force the return of 
Germany, first to the League sponsored disarmament talks and then 
to the League itself punched nails on the coffin of peace. 
 
Niall Ferguson, goes to great lengths in the ―War of the World‖ to 
demonstrate that World War II could have been prevented or 
significantly limited.45 It would be too presumptuous anyway to 
consider history fatalistically developing on a predetermined track. 
Had the right policies been implemented and World War II averted, 
one could argue that the League of Nations despite its flaws would 
have survived. Once institutions and orders are created they 
regularly become fixations on the stage until the point their demise 
becomes inevitable.  The League of Nations disbanded in 1946 only 
after the San Francisco Treaty established the United Nations. 
 
 
Hypothesis Four:  
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There is no doubt that a world order is shaped by the enduring 
interests of the leading actors. This invariably includes the 
fundamental aspect of the economic interest. It can also be said 
that the body of arrangements and norms that constitute a 
world order is also shaped in the mental image of these major 
actors. The Power Transition Theory‘s core assumptions about 
AFK Organski‘s four types of states (dominant state, great 
powers, middle powers and small powers) exerting differential 
influences on the evolution of regional and world orders 
supports this assertion, although no single dominant state was 
observed in modern history, including the United States. The 
unipolar moments may have existed and in terms of 
concentrations of power attributes unipolarity does exist. 
However, power and influence are not congruent and this very 
fact has been one dilemma puzzling even frustrating US and 
other intellectuals and policy makers alike. That said, historical 
experience does bear out the hypothesis that world orders are 
shaped by the economic and other interests of the leading 
actors.  
 
The world has almost always had certain orders that are 
weaved around the leading power or powers of the time and 
place. In what Falk calls the ―complacent consensus‖46 the 
world order until World War I, or more accurately roughly 
between 1648 and 1918, depended on a group of European 
―Great Powers‖ striking balance of power among them. The 
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world outside Europe was and treated as the periphery. For 
every local order outer rims form the periphery. However, this 
time around most of the rest of the world was already ruled 
directly or indirectly by naval European Empires. Particularly in 
the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, while the competition and 
violent rivalry continued among the Empires within Europe, their 
contests were more intensive in the periphery. And, ultimately 
this was part of the logic of the Concert of Europe in which 
groupings of European powers strived to enforce international 
norms and cooperated to that effect as they reassured that no 
single one of them could overpower the rest. This world order 
gave birth to the development of a set of generally accepted 
international laws, and a certain ad hoc conference or concert 
diplomacy. 
  
Economically, the mercantilist policies like the Navigation Acts 
in England effectively helped build up skilled industrial 
population and shipping industry and ushered in the modern 
capitalist system fueled European imperialism. However, as 
Industrial Revolution started to unfold and imperialism 
progressed, laissez faire policies came to supplant mercantilism 
as of late 18th century when the free trade ideas of classical 
economists led by Adam Smith won out. The premises of this 
European balance of power started to erode as following 
unification Germany started to grow incongruently within 
Europe and set its sight on the colonial territories or influence 
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zones of the other European powers. This coincided with the 
decline of the easternmost European Empire, the Ottomans, 
which opened further areas for imperial competition. By the time 
the European Powers engaged in the Great War the fall of 
Eurocentric conceptions of the world had already occurred in 
essence as the United States became the largest economy in 
the world by the turn of the 20th century. The US was until then 
a neutral and isolationist power in the rivalries within Europe. 
When Washington finally entered the war the US military power 
proved decisive. A certain world order had come to an end 
ushering in a new one which included in two non-European 
powers, the US and Japan, entering the political and military 
centre as they had entered the economic one decades ago. 
  
The world order set out by the Treaty of Versailles included 32 
states which ultimately became 63 although only 28 remained 
members throughout the lifespan of the organization between 
1920 and 1946. The League included members around the 
world except Africa. However, the continued Eurocentric nature 
of the organization was manifest in the fact that the Council‘s 
permanent members included five European countries (France, 
Italy, UK, Germany and the Soviet Union) and Japan. 
 
The US already the largest economy before 1914 was the main 
benefactor of the result of World War I due to the wealth 
accumulated by trading with the belligerent allies. Furthermore, the 
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US Senate‘s Nye Committee, which met between 1934 and 1936, 
established that the US loaned $2.3 billion to United Kingdom and 
allies which would have been lost if Germany won the war. The main 
reason why the US entered the war in 1917 was thus to protect 
investments in Europe. US entry into World War II also had an 
economic backdrop mainly related to Japan‘s obstruction of 
American economic access to China and the subsequent US 
embargo of oil and steel sales. Despite Senate‘s rejection of the 
Treaty of Versailles and thus membership to the League of Nations, 
due no less to the personal rivalry between President Wilson and the 
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, US engaged 
actively with Europe throughout the 1920‘s as its exports, imports 
and investments rose continually. In the interwar years US 
dominated the world economy and when it faced the Great 
Depression in 1929 the whole world and with it the international order 
went into a tailspin. 
  
The economic dimension of the post World War II order, like the 
political dimension, consolidated US preeminence, enhanced 
multilateral institutionalization and reflected the lessons learned from 
past failures. Thus the US Secretary of Treasury Morgenthau, in 
opening the international conference of 45 countries held in 1944 in 
Bretton Woods , blamed the Great Depression for breeding fascism 
and war and asserted that global economic institutions would create 
"a dynamic world community in which the peoples of every nation will 
be able to realize their potentialities in peace." The post World War II 
economic system thus depended on three main pillars. The first pillar 
comprised the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The 
IMF was tasked to structure the international monetary system in 
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order to make sure that exchange rates remained stable. This 
standardization of monetary policies would enhance international 
trade. After all, the experience with the Great Depression was that 
the ailing countries instinctively raised trade barriers which only 
worsened the crisis. The IMF would also provide temporary financial 
aid to countries that faced difficulty in their balance of payments. The 
World Bank or the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, on the other hand, would also assist the development 
of international trade by assisting the reconstruction and 
development of territories of members by facilitating the investment 
of capital for productive purposes. Together the two Bretton Woods 
institutions provide for a multilateral framework to manage economy 
and trade the collapse of which was seen to have direct implications 
for peace. 
 
The second pillar of the global economic order that was created after 
World War II was the institutionalization of US preeminence. The IMF 
ensured that values of the national currencies of its members were 
pegged to US dollar, and the value of the dollar to gold. This has 
consolidated US dollar as the dominant currency medium in 
international trade. In 1971, the Nixon administration ended the 
convertibility of the dollar into gold. Similarly the US would hold 20% 
of the votes at the World Bank, the largest public development body 
in the world. 
 
The third pillar was the bilateral US aid to war torn European 
economies. This started in 1945 under various different 
arrangements and between 1948-1951 European Recovery Program 
(Marshall Plan) kicked in to bundle and streamline various aid 
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schemes and extend some $13 billion (around $100 billion) more in 
current dollars.47 
 
The cumulative result was a smashing hit for the US and Europe. 
Economic recovery and later surge in Europe and US economic and 
financial power went hand in hand. The transatlantic economy, which 
brings together the first and the second economies of the world are 
inextricably interdependent. There is more European investment in 
Texas than U.S. investment in Japan, and European firms own more 
than $3.3 trillion worth of U.S. assets.48 The relative weight and thus 
importance of the direct investments is likely to change as the 
Chinese rise continues. However, the importance of America for 
Europe and Europe for American in the economic field will continue 
to be essential. 
  
Hypothesis Five:  
 
The ensuing order also rectifies some of the flaws of the previous 
generation of orders. The League of Nations upgraded and 
institutionalized the Concert of Europe system; UN and its Security 
Council built on the Council of the League of Nations empowered 
with wider range of authorities to protect peace; the World Trade 
Organization did not replace IMF and the World Bank but articulated 
and developed its trade promotion functions, and so the list goes. 
The subsequent has built on the precedent and in so doing 
ameliorated some its shortcomings and flaws. 
 
Hypothesis Six: 
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Any world order is also composed of a number of concurrent 
economic, political, military; global and regional orders. The 
global systemic orders cohabit with regional arrangements that 
establish a separate -albeit not incompatible- regional or even 
transnational orders. The European Union is the most 
advanced example in that regard. NAFTA, OSCE, ASEAN even 
Eurocontrol as well as countless regional and subregional 
arrangements establish a ―patternistic‖ order that regulates one 
or many aspects of international life. Additionally, as the 
postcolonial-theorists argue ―there are intimate connections 
between the private (e.g. ‗household‘) and the public (e.g. 
‗governance‘), the upstairs (e.g. ‗masters‘) and the downstairs 
(e.g. ‗servants‘), the insiders (e.g. ‗pure breds‘) and the 
outsiders (e.g. ‗hybrids‘), the micro-personal (e.g. ‗sex‘) and the 
macro-structural (e.g. ‗power‘).‖49 This truly complicates the 
grasp of a world order in truly holistic fashion. Except that the 
international order is conceived in mental image of the leading 
actors and thus reflect the reigning points of view with regard to 
the interrelationships (orders) that exist between different 
―worlds‖. 
 
Hypothesis Seven:  
 
Nonetheless, the world orders to date were never truly 
universal. The common fallacy is to presume that a ―world‖ 
order existed during the Cold War or even after. This 
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presumption of order would come as a shock to the millions of 
dead in the proxy wars or due to hunger all taking place in 
areas unregulated by the ―world order‖. The deadlocks in the 
UNSC that is tasked to regulate all conflict around the world, 
and the conflicts that took place in areas falling out of the zones 
of influence of the two opposing blocs, or failures in state 
governance in economies falling outside or the darker side of 
globalization rendered any order only partial not global.  
 
Hypothesis Eight:  
 
Yet, the trend is towards more and more expansive orders both 
in terms of geographical reach and in terms of the multiple 
layers of everyday life that the world order arrangements 
regulate. The human quest is to extend minimum international 
order as comprehensively as possible. Globalization, which is a 
beauty and a beast rolled into one, is the main driver. In fact, 
globalization is a process by which the world order seems to be 
expanding geographically and socio-economically. That 
however is bringing old periphery on par with the old center, 
threatening the primacy of the historical center. 
 
Hypothesis Nine:  
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At this point I need to introduce another perspective which 
returns to the relativity of the world order experience. I have 
already proposed that from the perspective of the effect of the 
minimum world order it matters whether one is situated within or 
outside the areas regulated by the order. A child born in 
Rwanda in 1994 has a completely different world order 
experience that a child born the same year in Bethesda, 
Maryland. Even within the order, it matters whether one is at the 
center or at the periphery. The center and periphery as well as 
the area governed by world order are inherently in dynamic 
evolution. This evolution is by human standards very gradual 
and generations long. Globalization however creates a dynamic 
by which transitions are hastened. As such some areas have 
been set in motion from outside to inside and from the periphery 
to the core. Far East as a region and Turkey as a country are 
examples to upward mobility within the order. Middle East is an 
example to mobility from without to within. For those who are 
located in the vicinity of those mobile ―units‖ change is an 
altogether robust concept. If the regional order around you is 
under pressure, despite all that globalization has done to shrink 
distances in a flat and global village, geographical proximity, as 
geography itself, matters a great deal. 
 
Hypothesis Ten:  
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Last but definitely not least, rises and falls of world orders do 
not happen in a deterministic fashion. If the last hundred years 
were the American century this is not only due to US rise but 
also the dramatic European decline. The speed and totality with 
which the latter occurred is not due to American rise but rather 
to the a multiplicity of reasons including human error. Just as 
history was not a sequence of preordained phenomena, the 
future will also not be that. Therefore, what will shape the future 
is not only whether and how other powers will rise but also how 
the US will decline. 
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IV 
 
 
SENESCENT AND NASCENT WORLD ORDERS 
 
 
When I put the aforementioned hypotheses together, a 
coherent model of change may emerge. I call my model of a 
symbiotic and evolutionary experience the mutual existence of 
senescent and nascent world orders. The paragraphs below 
chart the contours of the outbound (senescent) and the inbound 
(nascent) world systems. 
 
The current world order was shaped since late 19th century 
when Europe was beginning its decline, the US was quickly 
rising, Ottomans were dissolving, and much of the rest of the 
world except Japan was largely colonized. The world order in 
which we live has been a product of insufferable pain inflicted 
by humans on humans, world wars, economic and political 
collapses, and environmental degradation. This order has also 
engendered for the people who lived within its broadening 
center immeasurable prosperity, stability and progress.  
 
A marked characteristic of both the senescent and nascent 
world orders is globalization. It is hard to find a conclusive 
definition of globalization as scholars seem to disagree on the 
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scale and causation, as well as development, impact, and 
policy results of this phenomenon. There is disagreement even 
on the historical trajectory and chronology of globalization 
although there seems to a consensus on the point that in the 
past half century globalization has intensified. The journey 
might be traced back to the Islamic Golden Age, when traders 
and explorers from Muslim lands have established a ―global‖ 
links expanding trade, scientific and social interactions across 
the known world. The Silk Road later further advanced this 
integration. The territorial and particularly maritime expansion of 
Europeans into new continents also culminated in the discovery 
and colonization of America. The first multinational corporation, 
The Dutch East India Company, helped cultivate globalization 
as a business strategy in the 17th century. During the 19th 
century globalization was a fact of life through intensive 
international trade and investment between European imperial 
powers, their colonies and the United States. These links 
continually expanded to include sub-Saharan Africa and the 
Island Pacific. A world economic order was thus being created. 
The experience of protectionism during the 1930‘s depression 
engendered deliberative planning to promote international 
economic integration and trade liberalization. By then China 
had also entered the world economic system. It is hard to 
negate Noam Chomsky‘s assertion that globalization is 
beneficial to its designers: Multinational corporations and the 
powerful states to which they are closely linked. However, as 
capital became more multinational and its operations and 
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investments geographically widespread, globalization also 
came to empower the target markets.  
 
Anthony Giddens offers a particularly insightful definition of 
globalization ―as the intensification of worldwide social relations 
which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings 
are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice 
versa.‖50 This emphasis on ―social relations‖ more accurately 
depicts the multilayered impact of globalization. Thus it is no 
longer about a powerful country sapping the natural resources 
of a weaker one and trading the processed goods back to the 
initial producer of the natural resource. The interaction is 
profusely and intimately social including political. The vector of 
the relationship continues to flow more from the powerful 
towards the weaker but it is no longer one directional. The 
expansion of globalization is therefore no longer merely 
economic expansion. It is also cultural, sociological, political 
and even psychological. Values and institutions are passed on 
as much as goods and capital. As such the reach of the world 
order is congruous with the reach of the multiple layers of 
globalization. A country that is fully within the world order is 
protected to a large degree against the torrents of being 
excluded. That is the zone of modernity, prosperity, liberty, and 
security. That is the first world. A country starts entering the 
globalized world order when it starts benefiting from the 
governing arrangements and adopting some of the economic, 
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political, institutional fabrics worn in the first world. This includes 
democratization, constitutionalism, rule of the law, 
accountability, collective security, free trading, financial 
liberalization including through stock exchanges and the like. I 
will use this explanation in the remainder of this essay when 
talking about countries and regions in or out of step with the 
world order. 
 
The aging and rising world orders are cohabiting, one caving in, 
the other moving in. The following is an admittedly bird‘s eye 
view of the general contours of this asynchronous process or 
phenomenon. 
 
President Lula of Brazil at the G-7 Summit held in Evian in 2003 
reportedly said: ―Gentlemen, I would like to suggest to you that 
next year maybe you would like to meet in Brazil to get yourself 
ready for 20 years from now when 5 of you will not be here. 
Because you should understand that in that period of time, 20 
or 30 years from now, the number one country in the world will 
be China, number two will be the United States, number three 
will be India, number four will be Japan, and I regret to say that 
none of the rest of you will be here. I'll be here,' he said. 'But it 
would still be nice to have you around, so come get used to the 
developing world.‖51 What President Lula‘s intervention 
whimsically underscored was that the power structure of the 
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world is under change and this is creating a new reality that will 
be recognized in due course. 
 
The fundamental actors are the hyper power US, which is at the 
top of the global power structure, but may have reached the 
peak of its power potential; Europe which despite its painful and 
long decline still belongs at the top layer of the global power 
scala thanks to the EU, but is seriously lacking vision and 
direction. Discovering that vision and also admitting Turkey is 
likely to replenish the EU‘s potential to hang on to its position 
within the top layer. Together, the US and Europe form the top 
of the global power structure in almost every way. They also 
make up three of the five permanent posts in the worlds top 
multinational (or even supranational except for the permanent 
members) global organ, namely the UN Security Council. That 
Europe is not represented by a single seat at this forum is a 
relic of the war of half a century ago. 
 
After having amassed attributes of power that no other mortal 
power has been able to assemble, the US has entered a 
relative stagnation the course and result of which is yet to be 
seen. That said, US will continue to be the dominant global 
power during the lifetime of anyone alive on this day. Obviously, 
US power cannot be easily matched although the EU has 
already superseded American economic power. In the military 
realm, Washington spends almost half of the entire global 
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defense expenditures. The US defense budget is exceeds the 
combined spending of the next 46 countries. The US spends six 
times more than China, 10 times more than Russia and no less 
than 99 times than Iran. All the potential US rivals put together 
spend some $205 billion annually that is little over one third of 
US defense expenditures. However, even these numbers do 
not show the full picture. If one adds the defense expenditures 
of NATO allies, Japan, South Korea and Australia one reaches 
over 70% of all military spending in the world. One ought also to 
consider that all of the top ten defense companies in the world 
are from NATO countries. In terms of strategic culture, the US is 
accustomed to its leadership role and its elites are not likely to 
give up this position. The Obama administration is no 
exception. Furthermore, the current economic crisis can even 
produce the effect of a certain cleansing of the financial system 
thereby mitigating or even halting long term US economic 
decline. The financial crisis in Turkey in 2001 had exactly this 
sort of effect rendering Turkish economy one of the fastest 
growing in the world. The counter example of course is Japan 
which has not been able yet to recover fully since 1997. 
Whether the effect of the current crisis on the fate of the world‘s 
leading superpower will be along the Turkish or Japanese 
examples will have to be watched and seen. 
 
Russia is no longer the top contender against these two 
powers, but it has every resource to be on the rise and is thus 
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considered to be part of the BRIC. Russia‘s influence is 
curtailed by the loss of its political appeal but it is using its 
position in the energy market to recover ground lost since the 
end of the Cold War. It has also launched an open challenge 
against US-European primacy by attacking Georgia and 
recognizing the separation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from 
Georgia. However, Russia is a systemic power in almost every 
other field. 
 
China, like Russia, already belongs in the post World War II top 
layer of the global power structure including by virtue of its 
UNSC permanent membership. However, it is currently forming 
the second layer together with Russia. China is careful in not 
openly launching an anti-systemic challenge to the US primacy 
although it is not shy in drawing its own redlines including in 
Taiwan and Nepal. China is a major benefactor of globalization 
and thus far has been particularly lucky in staving off its 
inevitable challenges and problems. 
 
I have essentially recounted the UN Security Council‘s five 
existing permanent members which is illustrative of which 
countries the current world order, as an institutional global 
compact, has codified as the top powers. Clearly, this list is not 
totally representative of what actually forms the top of the power 
chain. Although all the listed powers are in the actual top layer, 
there are others which exert significant leverage. In a recent 
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study the Stanley Foundation concluded that ten countries will 
form the top layer of the global major powers layer. These are 
the US, EU, Turkey, South Africa, Russia, India, China, South 
Korea, Japan. Obviously, this list is subject to debate. For 
instance, it takes for granted that Turkey will remain outside the 
EU. However, with perhaps a few additions the list also reflects 
more or less a general consensus as to the top achievers in the 
world. If that scenario is realized, it would have ramifications for 
the global economic, political, institutional structures.  
It is interesting to note that at first side, leaving aside Russia‘s 
indecision, all the actors are in fact conforming to the global 
order that is shaped under the US lead. All act within the 
system, protect it, try to improve its position within the system, 
and aim to reform it without jeopardizing its fundamental 
parameters. They also show reflexes that try to keep the US 
within the order that US itself has pioneered. Furthermore, all of 
these powers shun the prospect of armed conflict between 
them. It can be said that the domestic dynamics of these 
countries, the type of the relationship that they will develop 
among them and how they would related to their close 
neighborhoods will be important from the perspective of the 
evolution of the coming world order. 
 
The reason why all the current and likely future major powers 
appear to support the current world order could be mainly 
economic. First of all being an anti-systemic power is 
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unbearably expensive even for a country like China that holds 
around $2 trillion in reserves. Secondly, all these powers rise by 
benefiting from the current world order albeit in different 
degrees. Thirdly, the level of interdependence among US and 
China is such that historian Neill Ferguson talks about a 
Chinamerica, which smacks of Brzezinski‘s one time Amerippon 
idea. At any rate, a version of the nuclear strategic doctrine of 
Mutual Assured Destruction that formed the underlying logic of 
the US-Soviet balance during the Cold War is probably now 
applicable in the economic domain between China and 
America, which can shatter each other‘s economies. 
 
The critical coefficient in the evolution of power structures will 
be not only how the BRIC‘s and the N-11 nations will manage 
their rise but also how the US will cope with the idea of a set of 
friendly or rival powers gradually closing the gap. The case of 
China‘s rise is particularly noteworthy although by no means the 
only challenge to the US pre-eminence. The power transition 
theoreticians show that under conditions of parity among two 
contending powers, if the challenger is dissatisfied, the 
probability of war increases dramatically.52 Yet, for all intents 
and purposes, the reality may be more complex and involve not 
a ―war‖ as such but a sustained and multifaceted global 
political, economic and even cultural struggle. This may happen 
even when what Ronald Tammen calls the ―harmonization of 
elites‖ is realized and when the ―elite ruling class ... is satisfied 
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with the international structure and the corresponding rules of 
the road.‖53 The current economic crisis has reconfirmed that 
the US and China have joint stakes in maintaining the current 
global system although China will surely have a number of 
amendments to seek and gradually it will grow more assertive 
in pursuit of what it sees as its national interest. However, near 
parity would also mean having to go through Beijing in every 
issue which the US, nor any other major power, is likely to 
tolerate. And, there will be many willing smaller actors that 
would likely play one power against the other. 
 
Needless to say, acting against the system is risky given that it 
would spark not only US but also the fellow small and large 
powers‘ potential resistance. Therefore, a free trading capitalist 
system has been anchored along the US-EU-China-India-Brazil 
axis and this forms the infrastructure of the evolving world 
order. This economic system will likely see specific 
amendments but will probably be resilient in its basic form 
beyond the horizon. However, there is already an old tension 
resurfacing between state control and the market this time with 
stronger vigor on the part of the proponents of state control. 
 
On the one side is the astounding achievement of the private 
business in the world. The free market has produced a dramatic 
reorientation of the power relationship between the nation state 
and the private enterprise. In our day and age the US defense 
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budget is only half of the annual sales of two companies, 
Walmart and ExxonMobil. The latter‘s annual sales is 
approximately on par with the GDP of the 19th largest economy 
in the world. Top 250 companies have annual earnings that 
form one third of the global GDP. One third of all assets in the 
world are controlled by the top 50 financial institutions. There 
are around 100 companies that have sales worth over $50 
billion whereas only 60 nation states have GDP of similar 
power.54 Private business is a powerful force. Ian Bremmer 
points out that the free market tide has receded: ―Across the 
United States, Europe, and much of the rest of the developed 
world, the recent wave of state interventionism is meant to 
lessen the pain of the current global recession and restore 
ailing economies to health. For the most part, the governments 
of developed countries do not intend to manage these 
economies indefinitely. However, an opposing intention lies 
behind similar interventions in the developing world: there the 
state's heavy hand in the economy is signaling a strategic 
rejection of free-market doctrine.‖55  
 
The 13 largest oil companies in the world, which Bremmer 
measures by their reserves, are owned and operated by 
governments. He thus argues that state capitalism in which the 
state functions as the leading economic actor and uses markets 
primarily for political gain is replacing free market policies. And, 
that signals a global competition not among rival political 
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ideologies but between competing economic models. This 
observation is interesting yet not necessarily novel. The free 
market has always been in tension with the state. What may be 
new is that the global economic crisis has increased this 
tension and created a backlash against neoliberalism also in 
the US and European markets. Therefore, Bremmer is right 
from his point of view in taking the nation-states‘ resurgence in 
the economic field seriously, because that trend can 
fundamentally influence economic policies and balances and 
thus the future place of private business in world order. 
However, the political dimension of the tension between state 
and private business can be equally if not more fundamentally 
important and game changing. 
 
The main ideology that supports the current world order is 
shaped by liberal or even neoliberal economy that promotes 
global access over national boundaries, social and individual 
freedoms that encourage creativity and skilled migration, and 
multi party democracy and rule of law regimes which maintain 
stability and facilitate resolution of differences within a society 
with other means than physical violence. Following the end of 
the Cold War and the demise of the rivaling ideological model, 
the idea of global governance has gathered increasing 
momentum. The principle and structures of global governance 
and globalization are mutually supportive. In this picture, just as 
there is the issue of state control over economy, there has 
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always been a comparable tension between state control and 
individual liberties. For at least a few generations it will not be 
realistic to expect China, Russia and scores of other countries 
to adopt a Western style liberal and pluralistic democratic 
political model.  
 
That will have at least three implications: Firstly, an ideology is 
ultimately only as powerful as the body in which it can insert 
itself. Read in reverse, whatever ideological model powerful 
countries adopt will find its admirers in other countries. A state 
controlled market economy, global trade liberalism matched 
with enlightened illiberal policies at home may well be an 
alternative model for a significant portion of the world. 
Variations of this model is likely to compete with Western 
models around the world and especially in countries that are 
outside the inner ring of the global order. Secondly, the liberal 
model has an evangelical tendency which would add tension to 
relations with countries which resist political liberalization. The 
colored revolutions of the 2000‘s have significantly soured the 
perceptions in Russia, Egypt and scores of other countries 
against the West which was suspected of instigating these 
popular movements. Thirdly, demands for liberal approaches 
will limit the reach of the West and ideas and values associated 
with it. The US has yet to invite the leader of Turkmenistan to 
Washington for an official visit despite the overwhelming 
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interests in forging good relations with this key energy security 
player. 
 
As I have explained, geopolitical shifts are underway both in 
terms of the configuration of the biggest powers that take 
leading roles in defining and upholding world order and those 
who remain outside the relatively stable order. At the same 
time, there are shifts that are ideational. This relates to a 
dynamic already unleashed that pulls away from the only 
remaining comprehensive and successful economic, political 
and social governance model, which finds its ideal form in 
neoliberalism. The ―only course, no alternative‖ approach 
underlying the ―end of history‖ thesis is now strongly contested 
around the world. 
 
However, this reaction to neoliberal, pro-globalization and world 
governance policies remain sporadic, disorganized and 
incoherent both intellectually and organizationally. How long it 
would take for this underlying opposition to find its wholesome 
ideological voice and example can only be guessed not 
foreseen. There is every reason to believe that China‘s 
economic success is already producing ripples that as long as 
China continues its rise will attract increasing proponents and 
advocates as well as theoreticians. 
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A process may already be underway in which liberal 
democracy-free market economy nexus supporting 
globalization is strongly contested at the popular level. The 
violent street protests are a common sideshow to the high level 
gatherings of the world‘s prosperous and powerful nations. 
These however do not as yet form a coherent whole and 
include a diversity of viewpoints including nihilists and 
anarchists. As Paul Rogers notes: ―The aspiration to what might 
be called the internationalisation of dissent has not yet been 
fully realised. But there are more than glimpses of the 
phenomenon in social, environmental and workers' movements 
- reflecting the fact that one result of globalization is the much 
wider understanding of the transnational nature of 
marginalization and exclusion. There is every chance that the 
early 2010s will indeed see the rise of fully transnational anti-
elite movements triggered by wholesale deprivation, fuelled by 
anger, and armed with the hunger for an inclusive and just 
world. In time, they may be as or even more potent than the 
anti-colonial movements of the 1950s and 1960s.‖56 In fact, the 
very formula that is touted as the agent for the transformation of 
the world into prosperous, peaceful, liberal and civic minded 
global community may just not be working that way.  
 
Amy Chua argues for example that ―the global spread of 
markets and democracy is a principal aggravating cause of 
group hatred and ethnic violence throughout the non-Western 
 80 
world.‖57 Scores of people who thrived within the system 
including such prominent names the Nobel laureate Joseph 
Stiglitz and George Soros criticize the process of globalization 
and seek to reform it. The idea of social justice and social 
security are once again in ascendancy. It remains to be seen 
whether the social democratic movements, long puzzled by the 
strength and vigor of neoliberalism, may regroup and find a 
discourse befitting the current realities. They would be in search 
of such a discourse that would channel some of the popular 
discontent into a positive and non-destructive political agenda 
that also safeguards democracy and economic opportunity. 
Obviously, these are not developments that China can inspire, 
but the message here is that the stuttering of neoliberalism is 
likely to challenge more liberalism as a panacea against all ills 
and create an ideational fracture. 
Whether the ideational fractures will lead to institutional 
consequences is a question worth asking. It is hardly so that the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) led by China and 
Russia or the Collective Security Treaty Organization lead by 
Russia amount to an organized illiberal front or even aspire to 
that. Their main focus is security and although the CSTO 
occasionally makes rather exaggerated self comparisons to 
NATO it simply is not in the same league. The Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization deserves greater attention. 
Comprising China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan the SCO dates back to 1996. Its original 
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purpose was to establish confidence and help demilitarize 
China-Soviet Union border. Its focus and visibility have been 
increasing in recent years. The SCO has no economic 
dimension and its political dimension is currently secondary to 
its security focus. Even on the latter front the level of integration 
of the SCO is rather limited. The organization in 2005 openly 
called for US to end its military bases in Central Asia. The SCO 
is not an organization that can be overlooked and history is 
replete with examples of nucleus organizations eventually 
sprawling and assuming additional tasks and missions. 
However, the strength of the SCO, namely having China and 
Russia as members, is also its potential weakness. The real 
world may just be too complicated with these two giants to 
demonstrate a lasting common front. 
 
On the other side, of course there are powerful and well 
established western led institutions already in place. The prime 
example is the NATO which is exclusively Europe and America 
and not global in membership. But, the idea is already out to 
develop an institutional framework that would transcend 
geographical limits and be based on ideological orientation. 
Although not the best example because of its different intention, 
Anne Bayefsky of the Hudson Institute called for a United 
Democratic Nations, ―an international organization of 
democracies, by democracies, and for democracies‖ to replace 
the ineffective United Nations.58 More to the point is the work by 
 82 
the Princeton Project on National Security under the lead of 
John Ikenberry and Anne Marie Slaughter, which called for the 
creation of a Concert of Democracies.  
 
The proposed Concert of Democracies would work towards the 
institutionalization of democratic peace. Thus, ―if the United 
Nations cannot be reformed, the Concert would provide an 
alternative forum for liberal democracies to authorize collective 
action, including the use of force, by a supermajority vote. Its 
membership would be selective, but self-selected. Members 
would have to pledge not to use or plan to use force against 
one another; commit to holding multiparty, free-and-fair 
elections at regular intervals; guarantee civil and political rights 
for their citizens enforceable by an independent judiciary; and 
accept the responsibility to protect.‖59 Thus, the Princeton 
Project‘s 2006 report Forging A World of Liberty Under Law: 
U.S. National Security in the 21st Century also argued that 
America would be safer, more prosperous and healthier if 
governments around the world were more popular, 
accountable, and rights regarding; if existing international 
institutions were reformed and new ones created to reflect 
liberal principles; and if the role of force was reconsidered in 
light of the threats of the 21st century. In the 2008 US elections 
Republican candidate John McCain also espoused a League of 
Democracies.  
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While not carrying much wind currently it should be seen totally 
within the realm of the probable that these ideas resurface also 
in the near future. They may even form the nucleus of the 
thinking behind the institutional makeup of the next world order 
either as a replacement to the United Nations, as the 
proponents on the left and right seem to suggest, or as a 
complement to it. Either way, another element of the senescent 
and the nascent world orders is again probably alive today. 
 
This brings up the issue of the institutions of the current and 
next world order. The power, ideological and economic 
foundations of the world order are protected by a 
comprehensive network of international organizations, which 
have been updated in due course. This network has the UN and 
UNSC, Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO, NATO, and 
from another angle EU and ASEAN. All of those should be 
expected to remain beyond the horizon but go through minimal 
reform, minimal in the sense that barring complete 
disintegration, the necessary far reaching reforms will be 
politically unachievable. 
 
Institutions obviously do shape the environment. However, 
more importantly international law and multinational structures 
are formed by the codification of what already exists or can 
exist. This codification is achieved in close proximity to the 
common denominators and under the lead of the dominant 
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power or powers. For the future institutional makeup a number 
of questions about the future nature of international relations 
should first find their answers. These include whether the US is 
prepared to share power or resist; whether ascendant actors 
will engage in attritive and/or violent struggles among them or 
with others; how the medium and smaller size countries will 
relate to the regional major powers; how a possible anti-
systemic ―revolutionary circumstance‖ in a major power would 
impact on the global system and other major powers. Under an 
optimistic scenario, the current world order may expand beyond 
current overrepresentation of the West to bring China and India  
but also potentially Turkey and other key states more into the 
decision shaping and decision making positions within the 
international organizations. At any rate, there is little doubt the 
future global institutions would be based on much more power 
sharing between America, Europe and Eastern Eurasia. 
 
That is certainly the case with regard to the so-called Bretton 
Woods institutions. Since the Nixon administration severed the 
dollar-gold parity in 1971, the biggest reform drive may actually 
be approaching the IMF and the World Bank. This should 
involve more appropriate representation of the emerging 
powers like China, India, Brazil and Turkey. Similarly, a new 
revenue model would be required to secure new lasting sources 
of revenues without levying additional burden on the indebted 
countries whose interest payments help sustain the IMF. But of 
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equal importance may be the criticism that these institutions 
have failed to promote development. The recipes advanced by 
the IMF and the World Bank could be revised. 
 
A process holding particular institutional promise is the G-20 
which represents the world‘s leading economies. The Group 
was established in 1999 with the purpose of promoting the 
integration of the major emerging economies into dialogue with 
the G-7 countries comprising the most developed, namely the 
US, Germany, Japan, UK, France, Italy and Canada. The G-20 
format thus includes all the G-7 countries, Russia (which is a 
member of G-8 for broader political interactions), and Argentina, 
Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, 
South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey, as well as the EU. The 
G-20 between 1999 and 2008 met annually at the level and 
within the mandate areas of the national finance ministers as 
well as central bank representatives. This group of twenty 
leading economies has been energized at the Heads of State 
and Government level by the US in November 2008 in order to 
create a broad global platform to tackle the current economic 
crisis. The G-20 did indeed make a good start in that regard 
when it pulled together a trillion dollars in support of the IMF 
when it met for the second time at the Summit level in London 
in April 2009. The Group also led the way to reform global 
financial management by calling for the regulation of hedge 
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funds and other means of shadow banking system that defied 
any control despite the trillions of dollars under their belt.  
 
However, for the G-20 to reach its full potential it needs to be 
conceived not only as a financial gathering but as a global 
political-economic forum that supports minimum world order 
and helps harmonize national policies of the twenty leading 
powers in the world. The G-20 rather than G-8 or any version of 
it is the institution of the future. However, in the meantime there 
will be reactionary inertia to hold on to the obsolescent G-8 or 
circumspect G-7 plus 5 (BRIC) frameworks as agreed at the G-
7‘s Heiligendam meeting. Here again the rule of redundancy 
until death is likely to apply because of the lack of zeal to end 
what is outdated and put in place that whose time has come. 
On the international security side, a critical question is whether 
it is possible to return from the current point where the erosion 
of the nuclear non proliferation regimes is a reality. Henry 
Kissinger at a speech referred to this question: ―If proliferation is 
not stopped now, it will project us into a world that will become 
morally and strategically unmanageable. There will be too many 
countries with nuclear weapons with too many varied 
incentives. We are reaching a point where we are running out of 
time, and we have to be honest with ourselves. What price are 
we willing to pay to stop an Iranian nuclear weapons 
program? Failing that, how do we propose to organize a world 
of rampant proliferation?‖60 Although the emphasis on Iran is 
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obvious, the question is more diffuse and profound. The 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is actually premised on the 
eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons and President 
Obama has referred to the zero option. That is probably not 
achievable. There is a realistic chance that a gradual if long 
slide may occur towards a world where nuclear proliferation is 
accepted and regulated to the extent possible by potentially 
new instruments. However, it is also likely that in the process 
several countries which have nuclear weapon ambitions face 
serious problems, one or two even military interventions.  
 
The Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty is already continuing its 
existence thanks to the life support it receives from numerous 
other nuclear non proliferation agreements, such as the Nuclear 
Supplier Group and several others. It is also around because it 
is basically impossible to negotiate anything new that would 
adequately answer the call with regard to how the nuclear 
monster is to be restrained. 
 
NATO is the most impressive military alliance in history. If the 
US is the predominant military hyperpower that is unique in 
history, NATO is even more than that. It is among the the most 
successful post-World War II constructs. This organization is 
however perennially mired in debate about its relevancy. Since 
the 1960‘s when this questioning first began, NATO has 
continued its existence and even expanded its base of 
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operations. This is an alliance which binds the first and the 
second ranking economies of the world together in a one for all, 
all for one treaty. There is no other defence community and 
organization that fulfils that function. Whatever the possible 
scenarios for the future of global governance and the place of 
cooperative security arrangements within world order, NATO‘s 
alternative does not as yet exist. The same cannot be said for 
the EU foreign and security policy whose meaningful existence 
is strictly contingent upon its liaison to NATO. That said EU‘s 
civilian crisis management capabilities are form niche and the 
most important security contributions to the world. One would 
be safe to assume that NATO will undergo reforms and 
transformations, but these will fall short of what is necessary 
and instead will reflect what is politically and bureaucratically 
possible. But, it will stick around into the next world order 
although the currently faltering mission to stabilize Afghanistan, 
obviously in which NATO is just one player along others and 
particularly the UN, poses a further risk to how the Alliance is 
perceived among its constituent peoples. 
 
The main natural resources supporting world order are 
hydrocarbons, mainly oil but increasingly natural gas; as well as 
uranium that is needed for nuclear energy. This is likely to 
continue for at least two more human generations. In the 
meantime, alternative energy resources will rapidly enter the 
field. The transition will not be abrupt but gradual. A new divide 
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will emerge between the states which lead and fall behind in 
investing in the development of future energy resources and 
generation means. It is now widely accepted that the next world 
order‘s energy and production base will have to be green (and 
blue). The future energy base will also be more technology 
intensive and distributed and utilized through more integrated 
and efficient networks. At any rate, as Jared Diamond explains 
in Collapse and Thomas Friedman in Hot, Flat and Crowded, 
the American model of development that is ecologically 
destructive is now implemented in China but it is not globally 
sustainable. The efforts to detract attention and focus from the 
impending global environmental catastrophes are not only 
counter factual but also inexcusably immoral. 
  
On the other hand, although the initial American experience 
with oil and the propelling effect it had on American takeoff tells 
otherwise, ultimately it is more essential to have access to 
energy resources and technologies than to own them. This is 
particularly true for countries which are vulnerable to foreign 
interventions and have feeble political structures. Oil is now the 
curse of a good deal of countries. Nuclear energy should also 
be expected to see a boost despite the potential negative 
implications for non proliferation. Even in the optimistic scenario 
of the world order‘s transformation without a major war, the 
turmoil will continue within and with regard to areas that will not 
be able to adjust to globalization. This also means that fierce 
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struggles will continue over natural resources including water. 
Areas that have been intentionally left outside contest, such as 
Antarctica, space, oceans and their beds are likely to face 
increasing competition. 
 
Geopolitics is therefore back with a vengeance. As Robert 
Kaplan aptly describes: ―rather than eliminating the relevance of 
geography, globalization is reinforcing it. Mass communications 
and economic integration are weakening many states, exposing 
a Hobbesian world of small, fractious regions. Within them, 
local, ethnic, and religious sources of identity are reasserting 
themselves, and because they are anchored to specific terrains, 
they are best explained by reference to geography. Like the 
faults that determine earthquakes, the political future will be 
defined by conflict and instability with a similar geographic logic. 
The upheaval spawned by the ongoing economic crisis is 
increasing the relevance of geography even further, by 
weakening social orders and other creations of humankind, 
leaving the natural frontiers of the globe as the only restraint.‖ 
At any rate the order of globalization is expanding inexorably 
towards the areas it has little touched. Globalization with its 
economic, political, social and institutional precepts must to 
expand. And, that expansion is not a bad thing. However the 
transition is not easy.  
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Remaining out of the system is the default position the inertia of 
which is hard to beat. However, the cost of staying out is far too 
heavier for the countries concerned and the world at large. The 
geopolitics of world order expansion will have significantly 
diverse effects on the countries involved. Some will successfully 
adapt and prosper, while several others will likely be squeezed 
under failing state structures, economic and social 
backwardness, and external interventions. Overall, as before, 
also in the future, staying out will be significantly more costly 
than accomplishing transfer towards the center. However, this 
geopolitics can also be tricky for the major powers. India and 
China are already competing in the Indian Ocean. Other races 
should be expected around the world. Historically, the process 
of pulling in China into the global economic market and the US-
Japanese competition around 1917 produced deep shocks, 
even entry of the US into a World War. 
 
In our day and age, four regions in particular will be subject to 
strong currents and potentially shocks of globalization. These 
are Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan; former Soviet Union‘s non-EU 
territories; former Ottoman Empire‘s Middle Eastern territories; 
Africa. 
 
Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan are situated in between major 
powers of the future and straddle key strategic resources or 
geo-strategic junctures. They are also grappling with anti-
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systemic movements that obstruct their change of tack towards 
the tight jacket of globalization and face significant violence 
potential. Pakistan is a nuclear weapon state, whereas Iran is 
progressing on that path. Although the dynamics in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan have come to show significant convergence, Iran 
is a separate issue in its own right. The future position of these 
three countries in any global or regional order will be the result 
of a major and trend setting struggle. 
 
The countries that broke away from the Soviet Union were once 
part of a bloc that aspired to shape the world order in its own 
image. Since the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet 
Union those that were lucky to be the neighbors of the 
European Union were pulled into the Union and the tranquility 
of the globalized world order. This involved speedy enactment 
of reforms to make their governance more compatible with the 
rest of the Union. Europe acted decisively and rapidly to tie 
them in within both the EU and NATO, thus ensuring American 
guarantee over their place within the West, which Europe alone 
could not and would not venture. The small size of these 
countries also helped significantly in dissolving the ancien 
regime and adoption of a completely new set of political and 
economic fabric.  
 
Those farther away from the EU and those which could not 
show the necessary resolve and sense of direction were not 
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that lucky. Russia as the center of the old regional order also 
could not carry through its own reforms and maintained a half in 
and half out presence on the margins of both the EU and China. 
The Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia and Armenia as well 
as all Central Asian Republics will be facing strong currents 
pulling them in all directions. Given the strong interests of 
Russia, Turkey, EU, US and China, including in terms of energy 
security, the future positioning of the countries of this basin 
stretching from Ukraine to Kazakhstan will be shaped by strong 
tremors. 
 
The broader Middle East is mostly the parts of the former 
Ottoman Empire that have remained behind in adapting to a 
regional and world order. The region displays the scars of the 
fact that the Major Powers failed to agree on what regional 
order would best reflect their interests. The design failed 
miserably also thanks to the fact that the Turkish War of 
Independence and the ensuing Ataturk reforms disrupted the 
model where a subservient and much weakened regional 
foreman would maintain a pithy minimum order subject to the 
direction and manipulation of the stronger external powers. 
Lausanne Treaty of 1923 defeated this design mainly pushed 
by the earlier Treaty of Sevres. What Ankara proved then was 
that no viable regional order can be established that would not 
take Turkey into account. But, Turkey itself could not impose an 
order either. Oil complicated the efforts to establish a benign 
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order as did the failure to incorporate the reality of Israel into 
regional thinking. 
 
Initially the League of Nations, in the wake of the failure of the 
Sevres design, struggled to regulate the competition of the 
World War I victors through mandates. In the wake of World 
War II, the countries of this region ran about without any 
coherent sense of direction behind different politico-economic 
models. They could not overcome the fractures among them. 
They developed a pattern of vacillation between authoritative 
regimes and opposition movements either detached from local 
realities or bereft of comprehensive and viable governance 
models.  
 
The US primacy also could not translate into a substantive US 
control of regional dynamics and did not engender a 
transformation that would help the region embark on a journey 
towards adopting the precepts of globalization. In nearly a 
century since the collapse of Pax Ottomanica, no stable order 
could have been established to replace the Ottoman order. 
Instead, the region is mired in conflict, backwardness, 
authoritarianism, extremism, and external manipulation and 
intervention. The US efforts since 1990‘s to apply the example 
of Eastern Europe in this region intensified in the wake of 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and produced ventures 
such as the invasion of Iraq and the Broader Middle East 
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initiatives, which are different in content and approach. In fact, 
the victory of Hamas in 2006 Palestinian elections has resulted 
in an upset for the US-led efforts. A new status has been 
created in Iraq the future of which is yet uncertain. And, Iran 
has been isolated as the only remaining point of resistance, 
except of course the resilient non state actors, and tightly put in 
a bind or potentially on a collision course. That said there is 
currently no lasting dynamic that would force liberalization and 
democratization of politics and economy and modernization of 
the social structures; except the example of Turkey.  This 
region which has been resisting all change expects strong 
quakes in the near future. 
 
Post-colonial Africa is almost entirely out of step with 
globalization. It is instead enmeshed all in but name within a 
deal that is but a leftover of their colonial past. However, the 
fact of the matter is that these are now independent countries 
with resources and the continent has new players including 
China and the US entering the field in addition to the lingering 
Europeans. The strongest naval power in the Indian Ocean and 
an emerging major power India should also be seen within this 
context. The competition over Africa will be more intense in 
comparison to the colonization experience of the last two 
centuries. Difficult times may indeed be ahead for the continent 
whose local progressive dynamics are scattered and as yet 
underdeveloped. 
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V 
 
BACK TO REMARRYING  
SCHOLARSHIP WITH POLICY 
 
 
Assessing how theory helps specific policy is a domain which 
the academia treats as voluntary. What does all of the above 
mean for a practitioner of international relations? Understanding 
the logic, direction, dynamics, protagonists, restraints, 
opportunities and perils of change, needless to say, are 
important on their own right. Setting priorities and assessing 
policy options could not, or rather should not, start before that 
exercise is first made in any detail. 
 
In this regard, major theories all have a perspective but are 
ultimately of little help in their individuality. Realism appears to 
be most popular throughout the world but taken at face value it 
would only help freeze innovative thinking at the local level to 
mitigate the security dilemmas and the ultimately fragile nature 
of the international law and institutions. Institutional 
neoliberalism help bring in the policy options of multilateral 
organizations including local ones which can go a long way in 
preserving the interests and aggrandizing the voice of medium 
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and smaller sized countries. Yet, they fall short in accounting for 
the possible disruptive and destructive influences of neoliberal 
policies on bodies that are alien to such constructs. 
Constructivists help by highlighting the fact that interests and 
organizing principles can and do often change potentially 
opening up new vistas in overcoming some ardent regional 
conflicts (although that aspect is grossly under researched by 
the constructivists). But, they fail to take into account the fact 
that there are probably some primordial reflexes that cannot be 
reprogrammed but only contained or channeled including ethnic 
conflict when circumstances for a flare-up exist. Some theories 
are too narrow, some too vague, some completely misleading 
(sorry Mr. Huntington), some even outright morally challenged. 
The basket holds a colorful and rich fruit salad. The diversity of 
the basket is contingent on one‘s own position on the global 
map. 
 
All theoretical paradigms are useful in their own way. They are 
also inadequate. Stephen Walt argues that academics need to 
make policy relevant suggestions. These suggestions are likely 
to have the same shortcomings as the theoretical 
underpinnings they are based on. That is not a dilemma 
peculiar to academics. Every policy maker also has a 
theoretical lens although pragmatism is the predominant mode 
for most. Then, theory and practice are bound by the same 
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problem of not being able to predict the future or design future-
proof models.  
 
Earlier in this essay I have argued that a common ground 
between scholarship and practice exists on three platforms, 
namely in shared baseline tasks of data collection and 
assessment; Policy Planning as an analysis and synthesis 
oriented bureaucratic platform; and think-tanks which aspire to 
influence policy through their policy recommendations. 
 
I will therefore now turn to think tanks and policy planning from 
the viewpoint of facilitating synergy between scholarship and 
practice based on data assessment and policy advice. 
a. Think Tanks 
 
Think Tank is a broad and sweeping term. These are 
organizations, usually non-profit, which characteristically have 
significant research arms. Typically, they produce publications, 
organize lectures, hold conferences, provide experts to testify in 
parliamentary committees and give media interviews. In the 
Anglo-American model at least on paper they are not 
associated with any political party. This is to receive tax-exempt 
status in Canada and the US. In Germany all major political 
parties also have a foundation, basically a policy and advocacy 
think tank, attached to them. At any rate, in reality, think tanks 
 99 
can be ideologically driven. As Sharon Orr writes, ―Over time 
the boundary between objective policy evaluations, a traditional 
think tank activity, and policy advocacy have become blurred as 
think tanks have become increasingly involved in lobbying 
government.‖ 61 Think tanks do policy analysis and can be a 
fertile source of policy ideas. They also generate or popularize 
new ones. Sharon Orr divides think tanks into three general 
categories, two of which are ―contract research‖ and ―advocacy‖ 
oriented think tanks. Leaving aside the advocacy organizations, 
the clientele for the contract research oriented think tanks are 
governments and the objective and task oriented studies they 
produce may or may not be available to public. These 
organizations employ researchers with diverse backgrounds 
including varying academic qualifications. 
 
The third type Orr identifies is closer to our topic. Thus the 
―Universities without students‖ as research-oriented 
organizations produce policy analyses that usually offer 
forward-looking policy recommendations. Their staff is 
composed mainly of academically trained scholars. The output 
includes books and articles in scholarly publications. Their 
research is academically rigorous and often long term rather 
than reactive to current events. Orr observes: ―although of an 
academic bent, their work is distinct from that of most university 
research because the first priority is on policy-oriented work, 
rather than the theoretically oriented work typical of most 
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university researchers. Universities without students are also 
less likely to publish in the academic refereed journals preferred 
by university scholars. Their research also tends to include at 
least some prescriptive policy suggestions, unlike most 
university research.‖62 
 
Chistopher DeMuth right before stepping down as President of 
the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) gave some interesting 
insights into the mind-set and objectives of think tanks in an op-
ed he published in the Wall Street Journal. AEI in its foundation 
has made several key contributions to the policy world. The 
policy of ―surge‖ in Iraq adopted by the Bush administration 
successfully in 2008 was based on Frederick Kagan‘s idea; one 
of AEI‘s founders, Raymond Moley, coined the term ―New Deal‖ 
whereas the brain father of neoliberalism, Milton Friedman was 
also a member of this conservative think tank also home to neo-
conservatism. Thus, DeMuth has argued that policy think tanks 
such as AEI have become important centers of applied 
scholarship and also ―terribly influential‖ due to the new 
methods they have discovered for organizing intellectual 
activity. These methods were superior in many respects (by no 
means all) to those of traditional research universities. He 
reasoned that think tanks were "schools" in the old sense of the 
term, namely ―groups of scholars who share a set of 
philosophical premises and take them as far as we can in 
empirical research, persuasive writing, and arguments among 
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ourselves and with those of other schools.‖ The organization 
model is also different from universities. The think-tank scholars 
are relieved of all administrative duties or privileges and 
concentrate solely on research and dissemination, the latter 
function also being promoted with alacrity. Think tank 
researches are top academics commissioned to study front-
burner policy issues and try to influence policy. DeMuth argues 
that it takes at least a dozen years for an idea produced at a 
think tank to find influence in academic and professional circles. 
But, ―think tanks serve as storehouses of ideas, patiently 
developed and nurtured, waiting for the crisis when practical 
men are desperately seeking a new approach, or for the 
inspired leader who sees the possibilities of action before the 
crisis arrives.‖63 AEI is of course by no means alone in either 
the US, or the global think tank hall of fame. The Center for 
American Progress is in the Obama administration what AEI 
was in the Bush administration. The Council on Foreign 
Relations, the Brookings Institution from the US, Chatham 
House, the International Institute for Strategic Studies in the 
UK, International Crisis Group with offices in several countries 
are iconic globally recognized powerhouses among several 
others. The think tank community is sprawling not just where is 
all began, the US, but all over the world from Turkey to China. 
Their track record in influencing policy is mixed and not 
comparable to the US where think tanks can serve also as 
government in waiting.  
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This has to do with funding as much as anything else. The best 
funded non-US think tanks include Overseas Development 
Institute in London with $25.9 million, German Institute for 
International and Security Affairs in Berlin with $16.4 million; 
IISS and Chatham House in London with $15.3 and $12.4 
million, respectively. The top US think tanks operate with 
phenomenal budgets. The annual budget of the Rand 
Corporation is a whopping $251 million. Brookings Institution 
works on a $60,7; Heritage $48,4; CFR $38,3; Wilson Center 
for International Scholars $34,5; Hoover Institute $34,1; and the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace $22 million 
dollars.64 Think tanks form one link between scholarship and 
practice. They are increasingly a global network and not only 
US and Eurocentric although as in academic scholarship also in 
this area the standing of non-Western ones are routinely 
underrated or even totally ignored.  
 
There are 5,465 think tanks worldwide, 1872 of which are 
based in North America. In fact only 350 think tanks are 
reportedly based in Washington, more than any country let 
alone city. Europe houses 1,722, entire Asia 653; Latin America 
and the Caribbean 538; and Oceania 38. Sub-Saharan Africa 
boasts a surprisingly high number of 424 think tanks whereas a 
relatively low figure of 218 exists in the Middle East and North 
Africa. The room for global growth however does exist as 
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almost all think tanks were created after 1951, the real take off 
occurred after 1980. And, I don‘t know where the Foreign Policy 
magazine puts the Turkish think tanks, some of which are 
increasingly influential in Turkey and but also abroad.65 
 
In terms of the linkage between scholarship and practice, think 
tanks and IR scholarship interact in at least two ways. One is 
through educational backgrounds. Typical expert in a research 
think tank has an advanced academic degree and probably 
spent time teaching at college level, some even continuing both 
university and think tank careers simultaneously or 
consecutively. The IR scholarship that may be more 
ideologically ―pure‖ in the college research (although that can 
well be disputed) is thus applied in the think tank context thanks 
to the shared academic base. It is less likely to have this sort of 
a revolving door, even in the US, let alone a simultaneous 
career track, for a practitioner in international relations, whether 
diplomat or political decision maker.  
 
Secondly, both research think tanks and the academia are 
publicly vocal institutions which publish extensively and give 
interviews. ―Publish or perish‖ is a common motto for both. 
While methodologies are completely different, their publications 
are monitored to a certain degree by each other. Actually, if a 
think tank researcher does not follow what leading academic 
scholars in a particular field have been arguing then probably 
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that would stand to his\her disadvantage sooner or later. I 
would argue that the same should apply to an academic 
regarding the research published by think tanks. This mutual 
interest would assure crosspollination although method and 
degree of immediate relevancy would continue to set the two 
apart. Think tanks are one common ground between academia 
and practice. However, practical focus and recommendations 
by themselves do not assure that the decision makers and their 
policy entourage take them on board or even pay serious 
attention to them. The problem, and I disagree with Nye and to 
a degree Walt in that regard, is not always that the academic 
scholarship produces policy irrelevant work, but it is rather that 
policy world has a tendency to be inward looking and rather 
overwhelmed with daily routines and demands. In that regard, 
think tanks are not that much less vulnerable than academia in 
getting the attention of the doers. 
b. Policy Planning 
 
Another platform that can reconcile scholarship and practice is 
the Policy Planning directorates found in the Foreign Ministries 
of numerous countries. The Policy Planning unit is essentially 
an analysis oriented bureaucratic platform. The website of the 
Chinese Foreign Ministry states that ―The Department of Policy 
Planning reports on issues of overall and strategic importance 
concerning the global situation and in international relations. It 
develops diplomatic policies and programs and is involved in 
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the drafting of annual foreign assistance plan. It also drafts 
important documents and speeches, makes foreign policy 
pronouncements, and coordinates research and analytical 
work. It oversees the compilation of China's diplomatic history.‖ 
The German counterpart ―deals with short and medium-term 
planning for issues that are relevant to foreign policy, and 
prepares topics that are of interest for the Minister's work. To 
this end, it works with academic and scientific institutes, 
foundations, political consultancy institutions and the policy 
planning staffs of other countries. It also hires experts from 
academia and business for specific projects, as required. The 
Policy Planning Staff helps coordinate research and 
development activities within the Federal Government. The 
Research Coordinator represents the Federal Foreign Office in 
the competent interministerial committee.‖66 The Finnish one 
―contributes to the formulation of foreign policy positions and 
guidelines and coordinates analyses and research.‖67  
 
Countries as large as the US or much smaller like Bhutan have 
such a unit in their foreign affairs ministry with more or less 
similar job definitions and purpose. Bhutan‘s Policy Planning 
Division for instance, like its cousins around the world ―work on 
crosscutting issues involving political, security, human rights 
and humanitarian affairs; look at matters that do not fall under 
the purview of other departments in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs; coordinate matters relating to international media and 
 106 
academia.‖ Overall, in its ideal form that hardly exists, the Policy 
Planning unit is expected to function as an in-house think tank 
which has the possibility of directly impacting policy from within 
rather than from without. However, impacting policy is easier 
said than done. 
 
The Policy Planning unit is essentially an American creation. It 
was founded by the legendary George F. Kennan upon the 
order of Secretary of State George Marshall in 1947. Thus, 
Kennan who was working in April 1947 on the ―sudden and 
urgent problem of aid to Greece and Turkey, was instructed to 
set up a planning staff without delay. The reason for urgency 
was the desperate situation in Western Europe. Secretary 
Marshall emphasized that if the United States didn't take the 
initiative to improve matters, others would. Kennan was ordered 
to assemble a staff, and to make recommendations within ten 
days or two weeks on U.S. actions regarding Europe. The only 
advice the general gave him was to ‗avoid trivia.‘"68 Currently, 
the Policy Planning Staff defines its mission as broad analytical 
studies of regional and functional issues, identifying gaps in 
policy, and initiating policy planning and formulation to fill these 
gaps as well as institutionalized "second opinion" on policy 
matters - providing recommendations and alternative courses of 
action to the Secretary of State; undertaking special projects; 
policy coordination; policy articulation including speech writing; 
liaison with nongovernmental organizations, the academic 
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community, think tanks, and others; planning talks with 
counterparts in other countries; and dissent to bring 
constructive, dissenting or alternative views on substantive 
foreign policy issues to the Secretary of State and Senior 
Department Officials. 
 
The American policy planners have started by helping put 
together the Marshall Aid and then played key roles in putting 
together Cold War strategy, NATO, the Korean War strategy, 
and the response to the 1956 Suez Crisis, to name a few 
brightest achievements.69 They had also signed on to several 
initiatives that did not take off including the so-called 
Community of Democracies and probably scores of others 
which no one remembers. 
 
US policy planning directors also assumed visible operational 
roles, including Dennis Ross‘ role in the Middle East Peace 
Process and Mitchell Reiss‘ role in the Northern Ireland Peace 
Process. 
 
The fact of the matter is that, aside from these operational roles 
where the policy planner becomes the practitioner, it is hard for 
the analysis and planning to impact policy. As Daniel Drezner 
argued Policy Planning units face a challenging task of 
―balancing the inherent tension between strategic planning and 
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operational authority.‖70 Even Kennan himself wrote when he 
decided to resign in 1949: ―It is time I recognized that my Policy 
Planning Staff, started nearly three years ago, has simply been 
a failure, like all previous attempts to bring order and foresight 
into the designing of foreign policy by special institutional 
arrangements.‖71 
 
As part of the bureaucracy any Policy Planning unit is subject to 
tension with expert operational units and the whims of short 
term crisis management. Kennan wrote about the impossibility 
of having the planning carried out outside the line of command: 
―the operating units-the geographical and functional units-will 
not take interference from any unit outside the line of 
command.‖72 The essential requirement to exercise genuine 
influence is to have the ear of the Minister, assuming of course 
that the Minister has the ear of the Prime Minister\President. 
Although Kennan‘s association with Secretary Marshal is 
considered exemplary, perhaps an even tighter relationship 
existed between Henry Kissinger and his Policy Planning 
Director Winston Lord, who followed Kissinger from the National 
Security Council to the State Department. However, his case 
demonstrated as documented by Daniel Madar that ―For 
planners concerned with being effective, usefulness defines not 
so much what may be explored, but what is practical to 
present.‖ The Minister finds the work of the Policy Planners 
useful because it reflects the Minister‘s criteria of relevance. 
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This circumscribes the independent thinking of the very unit that 
is, theoretically, tasked to do just that in support of better policy. 
Yet, ―If, on the other hand, they are not involved at the top, they 
will have substantive independence, but no effectiveness.‖73 
 
These internal problems are likely to be universal. However, 
they are not the only challenges of policy planning. The fact of 
the matter is that policy planning concerns prognostication of 
and intervention in events that did not yet occur. The past and 
present do not necessarily indicate the future. In this sense, to 
borrow Steven Bernstein and his colleagues‘ catchy 
formulation, ―God really gave physics the easier question‖. This 
is fundamentally impossible, yet necessary to try. Planning 
needs to occur if only to narrow down options, prepare the 
minds for the range of possibilities in the spirit of US President 
Eisenhower‘s famous motto: Plans are nothing, planning is 
everything. As Bloomfield rightly asserts: ―Large and small 
powers alike need new mental and conceptual tools for their 
survival in a world essentially beyond their control.‖74 
 
What the academic community and theory has to offer to policy 
planning is however subject to elaboration. The attack on the 
academic work in this regard is severe: ―Much theoretical and 
methodological work in the social sciences is unfortunately 
irrelevant to the needs of real-world planning, either because it 
is not applicable, or is still in the theory-building stage, or 
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because some of it is excessively primitive and even shoddy.‖75 
Others have asserted that policy planning is a different kind of 
intellectual work. After all, it is ―directed at that which has not 
yet happened, which means that the criteria on which we base 
our discussions of our contributions to it cannot model itself 
effortlessly on the scientific practices we follow in our scholarly 
work.‖76 But, the historical knowledge and theoretical insights of 
the academics should hold some value. The task then, the 
argument goes, is to present these contributions in forms that 
are accessible and accepted as policy-relevant. The academic 
profession is cut off from the current policy debates because 
essentially: ―Scholars in international relations tend to privilege 
arguments that reach back into the past and parse out one or 
two causal variables that are then posited to be the major 
driving forces of past and future outcomes.‖77 Therefore, a 
method that is more appropriate than deductive-nomothetic 
theory is needed by the IR scholarship in order to be relevant.  
 
This may take the form of hypotheses of how the future may 
unfold based on a chain of logic that connects drivers to 
outcomes, otherwise known as ―scenarios‖. Steven Bernstein 
et.al. make a strong point on the point that ―scenario-based 
forward thinking is a promising method for tracking the policies 
of actors and the evolution of the international system.‖78 Thus, 
argue Neuman and Overland, ―Scenario planning may be a 
heuristic skill that may come in handy in this regard. Building 
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and disseminating scenarios for the future is not traditional 
scholarly work. If one wants to have an impact on running 
policy, however, it may nonetheless be work for scholars.‖79  
 
Scenario building has in fact long been used in business. Shell 
is known to be working with scenarios since the 1960‘s. It is 
also spreading to government as the US National Intelligence 
Council‘s Global Trends 2025 report shows. Horizon scanning 
and scenario building are becoming legitimate instruments for 
policy planning, which almost universally is ―notoriously laggard 
in using or applying social science research tools, even the 
potentially valuable ones.‖80 I would argue that this will help 
partially but obviously not entirely mitigate some of the 
dilemmas of policy planning as a common platform for science 
and practice. 
 
The academic work will be essentially different from both the 
think tank and the policy planning activities. This point is 
uncontested at least in my eyes. That said, cross fertilization 
and mutual reckoning can be increased by enhancing common 
platforms, recognizing shared tasks and simply mutually paying 
due notice. 
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VI 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
In this essay I have proposed a few theses to conceptualize 
world orders and change. Accordingly, I have argued that: 
 
- Any international order is reflects the global political and 
economic architecture which in turn is a codification 
permitted by a given period‘s circumstances.  
 
- As such, a world order is not a novel creation but an 
arrangement that is naturally selected from among the 
already extant options.  
 
- The next order will be carrying the genes of its predecessor 
complete with several flaws that pass from generation to 
generation.  
 
- A world order is shaped by the enduring interests and the 
mental image of the leading actors.  
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- Every ensuing order rectifies some of the flaws of the 
previous generation of orders.  
 
- Any world order is also composed of a number of concurrent 
economic, political, military; global and regional orders.  
 
- The world orders to date were never truly universal.  
 
- Yet, the trend is towards more and more expansive orders 
both in terms of geographical reach and in terms of the 
multiple layers of everyday life that the world order 
arrangements regulate.  
 
- That said the world order experience is relative to how close 
within or without one is located to the center of the order.  
 
- And, last but not least, the rises and falls of world orders do 
not happen in a deterministic fashion. Decisions, cultures 
and personalities do matter. 
 
The current world order may just have been forged in a single 
continuum, probably since the Enlightenment in Europe, but 
more visibly since 19th century, with major turning points, 
moments of acceleration and deceleration, and a certain 
handover of lead roles. This single continuum included 
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moments of systemic shifts. But, those shifts have pushed 
forward ideas, structures and powers that were already around 
waiting for their opportune moment.  
 
The current economic crisis is unlikely to force a wholesale 
world order change. It may even reinforce the position of the 
central players simultaneously while bringing in more powers 
from the periphery to the center of globalization. Several 
regions will experience significant volatility. However, as the 
saying goes, the news of the demise of American dominance is 
grossly exaggerated. Similarly, neoliberal economic model is 
neither triumphant nor dead. But it is significantly challenged. 
The axis of contention will be between state capitalism and 
illiberal democracy on the one side versus free market economy 
-as mitigated by renewed vigor of social state- and pluralistic 
democracy on the other. Both sides in the above equation 
would be contained within the system and will stand separate 
from those failing state structures that will not be able to adjust 
and take part in globalization. In terms of institutions, no major 
institutional structure is likely to disappear in this crisis. The 
current economic shock is great enough to stimulate the growth 
of a new order; but not strong enough to obliterate the 
old/existing one. 
 
However, this should not obscure the fact that a new set of 
arrangements which future generations will call world order are 
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already in development and incubation. Until the old is replaced 
by the new, there is a coming positive redundancy of world 
orders. It is realistic to expect the current system to linger while 
the elements of the new order take stronger hold. The task then 
is to make sure that the two do not work counter purposes or 
their generational tensions do not culminate in a seismic 
discontinuity bringing a revolutionary new order or disorder to 
life. 
 
The academia and practitioners will be well advised to sharpen 
the tools of working together. Scenario based studies, common 
platforms such as the policy planning units and think tanks as 
well as minimal respect for each other would go a long way in 
helping both the academia and the policy wonks. After all, the 
founders of social sciences wanted to make the world a better 
place through the illumination of scholarship. To them theory 
could not be separate from policy. Theory‘s shortcomings in 
addressing the problems of actual politics would be 
disappointing after decades of IR scholarship. Rejection of the 
link, on the other hand, would have seemed unacceptable to 
them, as it seems inauspicious to this author. 
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